Information processing system and method for managing encrypted data with tag information

ABSTRACT

An enabling key block (EKB) used in an encrypted key distributing tree structure is generated by forming a simplified 2-branch or multi-branch type tree with a terminal node or leaf which is capable of decrypting on the basis of a key corresponding to a node or a leaf of the Simplified tree. Further, the EKB includes a tag for indicating a position of an encrypted key in the tree. The tag not only discriminates position but also stores data for judging the presence of encrypted key data within the EKB. As such, a considerable reduction in data quantity is realized, and the decrypting process in a device is also simplified.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application is a national phase entry under U.S.C. § 371 ofInternational Application No. PCT/JP01/02929, filed Apr. 4, 2001,published in Japanese, which claims priority from JP2000-105329, filedApr. 6, 2000, JP2000-179692, filed Jun. 15, 2000 and JP2000-317803,filed Oct. 18, 2000.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to an information processing system, aninformation processing method, an information recording medium, and aprogram distributing medium, and particularly, to a system and a methodfor distributing an encryption processing key in a system involvingencryption processing. Particularly, the invention relates to aninformation processing system, an information processing method, aninformation recording medium, and a program distributing medium, whichuses a tree-structured hierarchical key distributing system,reconstructs a hierarchical key distributing tree according to adistributing device to reduce the amount of data contained in adistributing key block to thereby reduce distributing message size,relieve loads of a content key distribution or data distribution whenvarious keys are renewed, and provide data safely.

Recently, various software data (which will be hereinafter calledcontents) such as game programs, voice data, image data, and so on havebeen actively circulated through a network such as an internet, orstorage media capable of being circulated such as a DVD, CD, etc. Thesecontents are reproducible by a PC (Personal Computer), or by mounting amemory medium, or are stored in a recording device within a recordingand reproducing apparatus attached to a PC and the like.

Information apparatuses such as a video game apparatus, PC and the like,have an interface for receiving the contents from a network or forgetting access to a DVD, CD and the like, and further have control meansnecessary for reproducing the contents, along with RAM, ROM and the likeused as a memory region for programs and data.

A user can reproduce various contents such as music data, image data, orprograms through the information apparatuses or a display, a speaker andthe like connected thereto.

Contents, such as game programs, music data, image data and the like,are generally held in their distribution rights by owners and salesagents. Accordingly, in distribution of these contents, there is apredetermined use limitation, that is, the use of contents is grantedonly to proper users so that reproduction without permission is notallowed.

One procedure for limiting use to authorized users is through encryptionprocessing. For example, various contents such as voice data, imagedata, game programs and the like are encrypted prior to distribution,and means for decrypting the encrypted contents, that is a decryptionkey, is given only to persons confirmed to be a proper user.

Data encryption and decryption using keys is well known.

There are a variety of data encrypting and decrypting methods using anencryption key and a decryption key, but there is, as one exampletherefor, a system called a “common key encryption system.” In thecommon key encryption system, an encryption key and a decryption key aremade to be common. The common key (content key) is given to a properuser so as to eliminate data access by an invalid user. An illustrationof a common key system is DES (Data Encryption Standard).

The encryption key and the decryption key as described above can beobtained by applying a unidirectional function such as a hash functionon the basis of a pass-word or the like, for example. As used herein, aunidirectional function is a function from which it is very difficult toobtain an input conversely from an output. For example, a pass-word(determined by a user) is used as an input to the unidirectionalfunction, and the encryption key and the decryption key are produced onthe basis of the output. It is nearly impossible, from the encryptionkey and the decryption key thus obtained, to conversely obtain thepass-word.

Another type of system is the “public key encryption system.” The publickey encryption system user, a public key for encryption. The documentencrypted by the public key can be subjected to decrypting by a privatekey corresponding to the public key. The private key is owned by theindividual who issued the public key, and the document encrypted by thepublic key can be decrypted by the individual having the private key(content key). A typical public key encryption system is RSA(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) encryption. As such, it is possible to provide asystem for enabling decryption of encrypted contents only by a properuser.

In the content distributing systems as described above, contents areencrypted to provide them to users, and a content key is provided fordecrypting the encrypted contents for use by a proper user. There isproposed a variation in which a content key for preventing invalidcopies of the content key itself is encrypted before being provided tothe proper user, and the encrypted content key is decrypted using adecryption key owned only by the proper user.

The judgment whether or not a user is proper is generally carried out byexecuting authenticating processing before distribution of contents orcontent keys, for example, between a content provider who is atransmitter of contents and a user's device. In general authenticatingprocessing, confirmation is made of a mating party, and a session keyeffective only for communication is produced. When authentication isestablished, data, for example, contents or a content key, is encryptedusing the produced session key for communication. The authenticatingsystem includes mutual authentication using a common key encryptionsystem, and an authentication system using a public key system. In theauthentication using a common key, the common key must be availablesystem wide which is inconvenient at the time of renewal processing.Further, in the public key system, the computation load is large alongwith requiring larger amounts of memory. The provisioning of such aprocessing means on each device is not desirable.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

It is an object of the present invention to provide an informationprocessing system, an information processing method, an informationrecording medium, and a program distributing medium, which enables thesafe transmission of data to a proper user without relying on the mutualauthentication processing between a transmitter and a receiver of dataas described above, and reconstructs a hierarchical key distributiontree according to a distribution tree in order to reduce the amount ofdata contained in a distribution key block to thereby reduce the size ofan encryption key, reduce the load of data transmission, and reduce theprocessing requirements for obtaining an encryption key in each device.

An information processing system according to the present invention isone for distributing encrypted message data that is capable of onlybeing used in not less than one selected device. The device comprising:encryption processing means for holding a different key set of a nodekey, which is peculiar to each node in a hierarchical tree structurehaving a plurality of different devices as leaves, and a leaf key, whichis peculiar to each device, and executing a decrypting process ofencrypted message data distributed to the device using the key set;wherein the encrypted message data distributed to the device has dataencrypted with a renewal node key, which is obtained by decrypting anenabling key block (EKB). The enabling key block (EKB) includes a datapart comprising encrypted key data, and a tag part, which is positiondiscrimination data of the encrypted key data in the hierarchical treestructure. The EKB includes encrypted key data into which the renewalnode key of at least one of the node keys in a group comprising nodesand leaves of the hierarchical tree structure is encrypted by a node keyor a leaf key in the group.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the encrypted key data is data intowhich a node key of the hierarchical tree structure is encrypted using asubordinate node key or a subordinate leaf key, and positiondiscrimination data stored in the tag part comprises a tag indicatingwhether there is encrypted key data at a subordinate left and rightnode, or leaf position of a node.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the encrypted key data comprisesonly keys corresponding to a node or a leaf of a reconstructedhierarchical tree that is reconstructed by selecting paths constitutinga simplified 2-branched type tree with terminal nodes or leaves withwhich the enabling key block (EKB) can be decrypted at the lowest stageto omit unnecessary nodes, and position discrimination data stored inthe tag part includes data indicating whether the encrypted keycorresponding to the tag of the enabling key block (EKB) is stored ornot.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the encrypted key data comprises akey corresponding to a node or a leaf of a reconstructed hierarchicaltree that is reconstructed by selecting paths constituting a simplified2-branched type tree with terminal nodes or leaves with which theenabling key block (EKB) can be decrypted at the lowest stage to omitunnecessary nodes, and position discrimination data stored in the tagpart includes tags for indicating whether there is encrypted key data ata left and a right node or a leaf position at a subordinate node, anddata for indicating whether the encrypted key corresponding to the tagis stored or not.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the reconstructed hierarchical treeis a tree constituted by selecting a sub-root, which is a top node of anentity defined as a subset tree of devices having a common element.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the encrypted key data comprises,(in a simplified multi-branched type tree having a terminal node or aleaf with which the enabling key block (EKB) can be decrypted at thelowermost stage) keys corresponding to a top node and terminal nodes orleaves, of a reconstructed hierarchical tree that is reconstructed byselecting paths directly connecting the terminal nodes or leaves and atop of the multi-branched type tree to omit an unnecessary node, andposition discrimination data stored in the tag part that includes dataindicating whether an encrypted key corresponding to the tag of theenabling key block (EKB) is stored or not.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the reconstructed hierarchical treeis a tree having not less than three branches connecting the top node(of a simplified multi-branched type tree) with terminal nodes orleaves.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the encryption processing means inthe device sequentially extracts the encrypted key data with data of thetag part in the enabling key block (EKB), executes a decrypting processto obtain the renewal node key, and decrypts the encrypted message datawith the obtained renewal node key.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the message data is a content keythat can be used as a decryption key for decrypting content.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the message data is anauthentication key used in the authentication process.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the message data is a key forgenerating an integrity check value (ICV) of the content.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing systemaccording to the present invention, the message data is program code.

Further, an information processing method according to the presentinvention is one for distributing encrypted message data capable of,only being used in not less than one selected device. The methodcomprising: an enabling key block (EKB) generating step for generatingan enabling key block (EKB) comprising a data part including encryptedkey data into which the renewal node key of at least one of the nodekeys in a group comprising, nodes and leaves of the hierarchical treestructure is renewed is encrypted with a node key or a leaf key in thegroup, and a tag part, which is position discrimination data in thehierarchical tree structure of encrypted key data stored in the datapart; and a message data distribution step for generating message dataencrypted with the renewal node key to distribute it to a device.

Further, one embodiment of the information processing method accordingto the present invention comprises a decrypting processing step ofexecuting a decrypting process on the encrypted message data using thekey set in a device holding a different key set of a node key, which ispeculiar to each node in the hierarchical structure, and a leaf keypeculiar to each device.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing methodaccording to the present invention, the enabling key block (EKB)generating step includes a step of encrypting a node key of thehierarchical tree structure using a subordinate node key, or asubordinate leaf key, to generate the encrypted key data, and a step ofgenerating a tag indicating whether there is encrypted key data at anode, or leaf position, at subordinate left and right positions of anode position.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing methodaccording to the present invention, the enabling key block (EKB)generating step includes a step of generating a reconstructedhierarchical tree by selecting paths of a simplified 2-branched typetree with a terminal node or leaf capable of decrypting the enabling keyblock (EKB) at the lowest stage to omit unnecessary nodes; a step ofgenerating an enabling key bock (EKB) using only a key corresponding toa node or leaf of the reconstructed hierarchical tree; and a step ofstoring data indicating whether an encrypted key corresponding to a tagof the enabling key block (EKB) is stored in the tag part or not.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing methodaccording to the present invention, the step of generating thereconstructed hierarchical tree includes a tree generating processingexecuted by selecting a sub-root, which is a top node of an entitydefined as a subset tree of devices having a common element.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing methodaccording to the present invention, the enabling key block (EKB)generating step includes a step of generating (in the simplifiedbranched type tree with a terminal node, or leaf, capable of decryptingthe enabling key bock (EKB) at the lowest stage) the reconstructedhierarchical tree by selecting a path for directly connecting theterminal node, or leaf, with the top of the multi-branched type tree;and a step of storing data indicating whether an encrypted key(corresponding to a tag of the enabling key bock (EKB)) is stored in thetag part or not.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing methodaccording to the present invention, the reconstructed hierarchical treegenerated is generated as a tree having not less than three branchesconnecting a top node (of a simplified multi-branched type tree) and aterminal node, or leaf.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing methodaccording to the present invention, the decrypting processing stepincludes a renewal node key obtaining step for obtaining the renewalnode key by sequentially extracting encrypted key data stored in thedata part on the basis of position discrimination data stored in the tagpart of the enabling key block (EKB); and a message data decrypting stepfor executing decryption of the encrypted message data with the renewalnode key.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing methodaccording to the present invention, the message data is a content keycapable of being used as a decryption key for decrypting the contentdata.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing methodaccording to the present invention, the message data is anauthentication key used in the authentication process.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing methodaccording to the present invention, the message data is a key forgenerating an integrity check value (ICV) of contents.

Further, in one embodiment of the information processing methodaccording to the present invention, the message data is program code.

Further, an information recording medium according to the presentinvention stores an enabling key block (EKB). The EKB comprises a datapart, including encrypted key data into which the renewal node key of atleast one of the node keys in a group comprising nodes and leaves of thehierarchical tree structure is encrypted with a node key or a leaf keyin the group, and a tag part, which is position discrimination data inthe hierarchical tree structure of encrypted key data stored in the datapart, and message data encrypted by the renewal node key.

Further, in one embodiment of the information recording medium accordingto the present invention, the encrypted key data included in theenabling key block (EKB) is data into which the node key of thehierarchical tree structure is encrypted using a subordinate node key ora subordinate leaf key; and the position discrimination data stored inthe tag part is a tag indicating whether there is key data at the node,or of leaf, position at the subordinate left and right positions of thenode position.

Further, in one embodiment of the information recording medium accordingto the present invention, the encrypted key data comprises a keycorresponding to a node, or a leaf, of a reconstructed hierarchical treethat is reconstructed by selecting paths of a simplified 2-branched typetree with a terminal node, or leaf, capable of decrypting the enablingkey block (EKB) at the lowest stage to omit unnecessary nodes; and theposition discrimination data stored in the tag part includes dataindicating whether an encrypted key corresponding to the tag of theenabling key block (EKB) is stored or not.

A program distributing medium according to the present invention is onefor distributing a computer program to execute on a computer system aprocess of generating an enabling key block (EKB) into which a renewalnode key of at least one of the node keys in a group comprising nodesand leaves of the hierarchical tree structure is encrypted with a nodekey or a leaf key in the group. The computer program includes a step ofgenerating a reconstructed hierarchical tree by selecting a path of asimplified 2-branched type tree with a terminal node, or a leaf, capableof decrypting the enabling key block (EKB) at the lowest stage to omitan unnecessary node; a step of generating the enabling key block (EKB)on the basis of only a key corresponding to a node or leaf of thereconstructed hierarchical tree; and a step of storing data indicatingwhether an encrypted key corresponding to a tag of the enabling keyblock (EKB) is stored or not.

In one aspect of the present invention, distribution of an encryptionkey in accordance with a hierarchical tree is used to suppress thedistributing message quantity necessary for key renewal as small aspossible. That is, the key distribution method in which each apparatusis arranged in each leaf by n-division is used to distribute, forexample, a content key, which is an encryption key of content data, oran authentication key used in authentication processing or a programcode along with an enabling key block through recording medium or acommunication circuit.

Further, the enabling key block comprises an encrypted key data part anda tag part, which shows a position of the encrypted key, whereby theamount of data is reduced to enable rapid execution of a decryptingprocess in a device. In accordance with an aspect of the invention, onlythe proper device is able to distribute decodable data safely.

It is noted that the program distributing medium according to thepresent invention is a medium for distributing a computer program in theform that can be read by a computer to a general computer system capableof executing, for example, various program codes. The medium includesrecording media such as CD, FD, MO, etc., or a transfer medium such as anetwork, whose form is not particularly limited.

Such a program distributing medium defines a cooperative relationshipbetween a computer program and a distributing medium. In other words, acomputer program is installed in a computer system through thedistributing medium to exhibit the cooperative operation in the computersystem to obtain the operation and effects described herein.

The other objects, features and advantages of the present invention willbe apparent from the detailed description with reference to theembodiments and the accompanying drawings of the present invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a view of an example of an information processing systemaccording to the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of a recording andreproducing apparatus that can be applied in the information processingsystem according to the present invention.

FIG. 3 shows an illustrative tree for use in explaining the encryptionprocessing of various keys and data in the information processing systemaccording to the present invention.

FIGS. 4A and 4B are views each showing an example of an enabling keyblock (EKB) used in the distribution of various keys and data in theinformation processing system according to the present invention.

FIG. 5 is a view showing an example of distribution and decrypting usingan enabling key block in the information processing system according tothe present invention.

FIG. 6 is a view showing an illustrative format of an enabling key block(EKB) in the information processing system according to the presentinvention.

FIGS. 7A to 7C are views illustrating a tag of an enabling key block(EKB) in the information processing system according to the presentinvention.

FIGS. 8A and 8B are views illustrating an enabling key block (EKB) andthe distribution of content keys and contents in the informationprocessing system according to the present invention.

FIG. 9 is a view showing an example of processing in a device withrespect to an enabling key block (EKB), content keys, and contents inthe information processing system according to the present invention.

FIG. 10 is a view illustrating the case where an enabling key block(EKB) and contents are stored in the information processing systemaccording to the present invention.

FIGS. 11A and 11B illustrate a comparison between processing in theinformation processing system according to the present invention andconventional processing.

FIG. 12 is a view showing an authentication processing sequenceaccording to an applicable common key encryption system in theinformation processing system according to the present invention.

FIG. 13 is a view showing an enabling key block (EKB), data distributionwith an authentication key, and processing by a device in theinformation processing system according to the present invention.

FIG. 14 is another view showing an enabling key block (EKB), datadistribution with an authentication key, and processing by a device inthe information processing system according to the present invention.

FIG. 15 is a view showing an authentication processing sequence by apublic key encryption system applicable in the information processingsystem according to the present invention.

FIG. 16 is a view showing processing for distributing an enabling keyblock (EKB) and content keys using the authentication principle by apublic key encryption system in the present invention.

FIG. 17 is a view showing processing for distributing an enabling keyblock (EKB) and encrypted program data in the information processingsystem according to the present invention.

FIG. 18 is a view showing an example of MAC value production used inproduction of a content integrity check value (ICV) applicable in thepresent invention.

FIG. 19 is a view showing distribution of an enabling key block (EKB)and an ICV producing key, and illustrating processing in a device in theinformation processing system according to the present invention.

FIG. 20 is another view showing distribution of an enabling key block(EKB) and an ICV producing key, and illustrative processing in a devicein the information processing system according to the present invention.

FIGS. 21A and 21B are views for use in explaining a copy preventivefunction where an applicable content integrity check value (ICV) isstored in a medium in the present invention.

FIG. 22 is a view for illustrating the control of an applicable contentintegrity check value (ICV) separately from a content storage medium inthe present invention.

FIG. 23 is a view illustrating a hierarchical tree structure in theinformation processing system of the present invention.

FIGS. 24A and 24B are views for use in explaining the production of asimplified enabling key block (EKB) in the information processing systemof the present invention.

FIGS. 25A and 25B are views for use in explaining the production of anenabling key block (EKB) in the information processing system of thepresent invention.

FIGS. 26A and 26B are views for use in explaining a simplified enablingkey block (EKB) in the information processing system of the presentinvention.

FIGS. 27A and 27B are additional views for use in explaining asimplified enabling key block (EKB) in the information processing systemof the present invention.

FIGS. 28A to 28C are views for use in explaining entity control of ahierarchical tree structure in the information processing system of thepresent invention.

FIGS. 29A to 29C are views for use in explaining, in detail, entitycontrol in the information processing system of the present invention.

FIGS. 30A and 30B are additional views for use in explaining entitycontrol in the information processing system of the present invention.

FIG. 31 is a view for use in explaining a reserve node of a hierarchicaltree structure in the information processing system of the presentinvention.

FIG. 32 is a view for use in explaining a new entity registrationsequence in the information processing system of the present invention.

FIG. 33 is a view for use in explaining a relationship between a newentity and a host entity in the information processing system of thepresent invention.

FIGS. 34A and 34B are views for use in explaining a sub-EKB in theinformation processing system of the present invention.

FIGS. 35A to 35D are views for use in explaining device revokeprocessing in the information processing system of the presentinvention.

FIG. 36 is another view for use in explaining device revoke processingin the information processing system of the present invention.

FIGS. 37A and 37B are views for use in explaining a renewal sub-EKB atthe time of a device revocation in the information processing system ofthe present invention.

FIGS. 38A to 38D are views for use in explaining entity revokeprocessing in the information processing system of the presentinvention.

FIG. 39 is another view for use in explaining entity revoke processingin the information processing system of the present invention.

FIG. 40 is a view illustrating a relationship between a revoke entityand a host entity in the information processing system of the presentinvention.

FIG. 41 is a view for use in explaining capability setting in theinformation processing system of the present invention.

FIG. 42 is another view for use in explaining capability setting in theinformation processing system of the present invention.

FIGS. 43A and 43B are views illustrating a capability control table forcontrolling a key issuing center (KDC) in the information processingsystem of the present invention.

FIG. 44 shown an illustrative EKB producing processing flowchart in theinformation processing system of the present invention.

FIG. 45 is a view illustrating capability notice processing in theinformation processing system of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIG. 1 shows an example of a content distributing system to which thedata processing system of the present invention can be applied. Thecontent distributing side 10 transmits encrypted content, or anencrypted content key, to various content reproducible apparatuses onthe content receiving side 20. The apparatus on the content receivingside 20 decrypts the received encrypted content or the receivedencrypted content key, to obtain the content, or the content key, andcarries out reproduction of image data and voice data or execution ofvarious programs. The exchange of data between the content distributingside 10 and the content receiving side 20 is executed through a networksuch as an internet or through a circulatable recording medium such asDVD, CD.

The data distributing means on the content distributing side 10 includesan internet 11, a broadcasting satellite 12, a telephone circuit 13,media 14 such as DVD, CD, etc., and on the other hand, the devices onthe content receiving side 20 include a personal computer (PC) (21 or22) portable apparatuses 23 such as a portable device (PD), a portabletelephone, PDA (Personal Digital Assistants), etc., a recording andreproducing unit 24 such as DVD, CD players, and a reproductionexclusive-use unit 25 such as a game terminal. In these devices on thecontent receiving side 20, contents distributed from the contentdistributing side 10 are obtained from communication means such as anetwork, or from a media 30.

FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of a recording and reproducing device 100as one example of devices on the content receiving side 20 shown inFIG. 1. The recording and reproducing device 100 has an input/output I/F(Interface) 120, a MPEG (Moving Picture Experts Group) codec 130, an I/F(Interface) 140 provided with A/D, D/A converter 141, an encryptionprocessing means 150, ROM (Read Only Memory) 160, CPU (CentralProcessing Unit) 170, a memory 180, and a drive 190 for a recordingmedium 195, which are connected to each other by a bus 110.

The input/output I/F 120 receives a digital signal comprising variouscontents such as an image, voice, a program, etc., and provide thecontent to the bus 110, and, conversely, receives a digital signal fromthe bus 110 and provides it to the outside. The MPEG codec 130 decryptsMPEG coded data supplied through the bus 110 to output it to theinput/output I/F 140, and MPEG-decrypts a digital signal supplied fromthe input/output I/F 140 to output it to the bus 110. The input/outputI/F 140 contains an A/D, D/A converter 141 therein. The input/output I/F140 receives an analog signal representing content supplied from theoutside, which is subjected to A/D (Analog Digital) conversion by theA/D, D/A converter 141 whereby the signal is output as a digital signalto the MPEG codec 130. Conversely, a digital signal from the MPEG codec130 is subjected to D/A (Digital Analog) conversion by the A/D, D/Aconverter 141, which is output as an analog signal to the outside.

The encryption processing means 150 comprises, for example, an LSI(Large Scale Integrated circuit) chip, for performing encrypting,decrypting or authentication processing of a digital signal suppliedthrough the bus 110, and for providing encrypted data and decrypted datato the bus 110. The encryption processing means 150 can be also realizedby not only the one chip LSI but by a combination of various softwareand/or hardware.

ROM 160 stores program data processed by the recording and reproducingdevice. The CPU 170 executes programs stored in the ROM 160 and thememory 180 to thereby control the MPEG codec 130 and the encryptionprocessing means 150. The memory 180 is for example, a non-volatilememory, which stores a program that is executed by the CPU 170, datanecessary for operation of CPU 170, and a key set used in the encryptionprocessing executed by the device. The key set will be explained later.The drive 190 drives the recoding medium 195 capable of recording andreproducing digital data to thereby read (reproduce) digital data fromthe recording medium 195 to output it to the bus 110, and suppliesdigital data supplied through the bus 110 to the recording medium 195for recording.

The recording medium 195 is a medium capable of storing digital data,for example, an optical disk such as DVD, CD, an optical magnetic disk,a magnetic disk, a magnetic tape, or a semiconductor memory such as RAM,and in the present embodiment, the medium can be detachably mounted onthe drive 190. However, the recording medium 195 may be housed in therecording and reproducing device 100.

The encryption processing means 150 shown in FIG. 2 may comprise asingle one-chip LSI, and may also be realized by a combination ofsoftware and a hardware.

Next, an arrangement for holding an encryption processing key in eachdevice and a data distributing arrangement where encrypted data aredistributed from the content distributing side 10 shown in FIG. 1 toeach device on the content receiving side 20 will be described usingFIG. 3.

Numbers 0 to 15 shown in the lowest stage in FIG. 3 are individualdevices on the content receiving side 20. That is, each leaf of thehierarchical tree structure shown in FIG. 3 corresponds to a device.

Each of devices 0 to 15 stores a key set comprising the keys assigned toeach node from its own leaf to a root (node keys) and its leaf key, inthe hierarchical tree shown in FIG. 3. This key set is determined at thetime of manufacture or at the time of shipment, or afterwards. K0000 toK1111 shown in the lowest stage of FIG. 3 are respectively leaf keysassigned to devices 0 to 15, and keys from KR to K111 described in thesecond node from the lowest stage are node keys.

For example, a device 0 has a key set comprising a leaf key K0000 andnode keys K000, K00, K0, KR. A device 5 has a key set comprising K0101,K010, K01, K0, KR. A device 15 has a key set comprising K1111, K111,K11, K1, KR. In the tree of FIG. 3, only 16 devices (0 to 15) aredescribed, and the tree structure illustrates a well balanced a 4-stagetree. However, many more devices may be accommodated in a tree, and theparts of a tree may have different numbers of stages.

Further, each device included in the tree structure shown in FIG. 3includes various recording media, for example, DVD, CD, MD of theembedded type or the type detachably mounted on the device, or devicesof various types using a flash memory or the like. Further, variousapplication services may coexist. In this context, the hierarchical treestructure shown in FIG. 3 is applied.

In the system in which various devices and applications coexist, forexample, a portion surrounded by the dotted line in FIG. 3, that is, thedevices 0, 1, 2 and 3 are illustratively set as a single group using thesame recording medium. For example, with respect to the device includedin the group surrounded by the dotted line, processing is executed suchthat common content is encrypted and sent from a provider, a content keyused in common to devices is sent, or payment data for content chargesis also encrypted and output from each device to a provider or asettlement organization. Similarly, an organization (such as a contentprovider or a settlement organization) for carrying out datatransmission to and from the devices executes processing treating thedevices 0, 1, 2, 3 as one group. A plurality of such groups are presentin the tree of FIG. 3. The organization functions as a message datadistributing means.

Node keys and leaf keys may be collectively controlled by a single keycontrol center, or may be controlled on a group basis by the messagedata distributing means. These node keys and leaf keys are subjected torenewal processing when a key is leaked. This renewal processing isexecuted by a key control center, a provider or a settlementorganization.

In this tree structure, as will be apparent from FIG. 3, three devices0, 1, 2 and 3 included in one group hold common node keys K00, K0, KR.By utilizing these common node keys, for example, a common content keycan be distributed to only devices 0, 1, 2, 3. For example, if the nodekey K00 is set as a content key, only the devices 0, 1, 2, 3 can utilizekey K00 as a common content key. Further, if encrypted data Enc(K00,Kcon) is distributed to the devices 0, 1, 2, 3 through a network or bybeing stored in the recording medium, only the devices 0, 1, 2, 3 candecrypt the encrypted data Enc(K00, Kcon) using the common node key K00to obtain the content key: Kcon. (As used herein, the notation Enc(Ka,Kb) indicates data into which Kb is encrypted by Ka.)

Further, where at the time t, keys: K0011, K001, K00, K0 and KR owned bythe device 3 are analyzed by a hacker and then exposed, it is necessaryfor protecting subsequent data transmission to the group in to separateout the device 3 from the group. To this end, node keys: K001, K00, K0,KR are respectively renewed to new keys K(t)001, K(t)00, K(t)0, K(t)R,which renewed keys are sent to the devices 0, 1, 2. (As used herein,K(t)aaa indicates a renewal of key Kaaa at time t.)

The distributing of a renewal key will now be described. Renewal of akey is executed by storing a table comprising a block of data called“enabling key block (EKB)” in a network, for example, or in a recordingmedium for supply to the devices 0, 1 and 2. The enabling key block(EKB) comprises a decryption key for distributing a newly renewed key toa device corresponding to each leaf of the tree structure shown in FIG.3. The enabling key block (EKB) is sometimes called a key renewal block(KRB: Key Renewal Block).

In the enabling key block (EKB) shown in FIG. 4A, only those keys thatneed to be renewed comprise the EKB. As will be apparent from FIG. 3,the device 0 and the device 1 require K(t)00, K(t)0, K(t)R as renewalnode keys, and the device 2 requires K(t)001, K(t)00, K(t)0, K(t)R asrenewal node keys.

As shown in FIG. 4A, a plurality of encrypted keys are included in theEKB. The encrypted key in the lowest stage is Enc(K0010, K(t)001). Thisis a renewal node key K(t)001 encrypted by a leaf key K0010 of thedevice 2, and the device 2 is able to decrypt this encrypted key by itsleaf key to obtain K(t)001. By using K(t)001 obtained by decrypting, anencrypted key Enc(K(t)001, K(t)00) in the second stage from the bottomcan be decrypted to obtain a renewal node key K(t)00. Sequentially, anencrypted key Enc(K(t)00, K(t)0) in the second stage from the top of theEKB of FIG. 4A is decrypted to obtain a renewal node key K(t)0, and anencrypted key Enc(K(t)0, K(t)R) in the first stage from the top of theEKB of FIG. 4A is decrypted to obtain K(t)R.

On the other hand, in the devices 0 and 1 a node key K000 is notincluded to be renewed. The renewal keys are K(t)00, K(t)0 and K(t)R.The devices 0 and 1 decrypt an encrypted key Enc(K000, K(t)00) in thethird stage from the top of the EKB of FIG. 4A to obtain K(t)00, andthereafter, an encrypted key Enc(K(t)00, K(t)0) in the second stage fromthe top of the EKB of FIG. 4A is decrypted, and an encrypted keyEnc(K(t)0, K(t)R) in the first stage from the top of the EKB of FIG. 4Ais decrypted to obtain K(t)R. By doing so, the devices 0, 1 and 2 canobtain a renewed key K(t)R. The index in the EKB of FIG. 4A shows theabsolute address of a node key and a leaf key used as a decryption key.

Where renewal of a node key: K(t)0, K(t)R in the upper stage in the treestructure shown in FIG. 3 is unnecessary, and renewal processing of onlythe node key K00 is necessary the enabling key block (EKB) shown in FIG.4B can be used to distribute a renewal nod key K(t)00 to the devices 0,1 and 2.

The EKB shown in FIG. 4B can be used, for example, to distribute a newcommon content key to a specific group. Illustratively, it is supposedthat the devices 0, 1, 2 and 3 shown by the dotted line in FIG. 3 use arecording medium, and a new common content key K(t)con is necessary. Atthis time, Enc(K(t)00, K(t)con) is distributed with the EKB shown inFIG. 4B to devices 0, 1 and 2. By this distribution, distribution ofdata not decrypted in the apparatus of other groups such as a device 4becomes enabled.

That is, if the devices 0, 1, and 2 decrypt the encrypted sentence usingK(t)00 obtained by processing the EKB of FIG. 4B, a content key,K(t)con, at the time can be obtained.

FIG. 5 shows an example for obtaining a content key, K(t)con, at thetime t, in a device 0, which receives, through a recording medium, dataEnc(K(t)00, K(t)con) (into which the new common content key K(t)con isencrypted using K(t)00) and the EKB shown in FIG. 4B. That is, this isan example in which encrypted message data in an EKB is a content keyK(t)con.

As shown in FIG. 5, a device 0 uses a node key K000 stored in advance byitself to produce a renewal node key K(t)00 from the EKB by the EKBprocessing similar to that described above. Further, a renewal contentkey K(t)con is decrypted using the renewal node key K(t)00 and isencrypted by a leaf key K0000 owned by device 0 and then stored forlater use.

FIG. 6 shows an example of a format of the enabling key block (EKB). Aversion 601 is a discriminator showing the version of the enabling keyblock (EKB). The version is for use in discriminating between the latestEKB and a content. The depth 602 provides the number of hierarchies of ahierarchical tree with respect to a device of the distributingdestination of the enabling key block (EKB). A data pointer 603 is apointer for indicating a position of data part of the enabling key block(EKB), and a tag pointer 604 is a pointer for indicating a position of atag part of the EKB, and a signature pointer 605 is a pointer forindicating a position of the signature part of the EKB.

Data part 606 stores, for example, various encrypted keys in connectionwith a renewal node key as shown in FIG. 5.

Tag part 607 is a tag for indicating a positional relationship ofencrypted node keys and leaf keys stored in the data part. An attachingrule of this tag will be described with reference to FIGS. 7A to 7C.FIGS. 7A to 7C show an example for sending the enabling key block (EKB)described previously in FIG. 4A as data. The data at that time is asshown in FIG. 7B. An address of a top node included in an encrypted keyat that time is used as a top node address. In this case, since arenewal key of a root key K(t)R is included, a top node address is KR.At this time, for example, data Enc(K(t)0, K(t)R) in the uppermost stageis at a position shown in the hierarchical tree shown in FIG. 7A. (Thenext data is Enc(K(t)00, K(t)0), which is at a position under on theleft hand of the previous data in the tree. Where data exists, a tag isset to 0, and where data does not exist, a tag is set to 1. The tag isset as (left (L) tag, right (R) tag). Here, since data exists at theleft of the data at the top stage Enc(K(t)0, K(t)R), L tag=0, and sincedata does not exist to the right, R tag=1. Tags are set to all the datato constitute a row of data and a row of tags as, shown in FIG. 7C.

The tag is set in order to show at which position of the tree structuredata Enc(Kxxx, Kyyy) is positioned. Since the key data Enc(Kxxx, Kyyy) .. . are mere enumerated data of simply encrypted keys, a position on thetree of an encrypted key stored as data can be discriminated by theaforementioned tag.

Alternatively, for example, data as shown below can be provided usingthe node index placed in correspondence to the encrypted data as shownin FIGS. 4A and 4B previously without using the aforementioned tag:

1. 0: Enc(K(t)0, K(t)root)

2. 00: Enc(K(t)00, K(t)0)

3. 000: Enc(K(t)000, K(t)00)

4. . . .

However, using such an index as shown above results in a larger sizeEKB, which is not preferable in distribution through a network. On theother hand, use of the aforementioned tag as index data allowsdiscrimination of a key position using less data.

Returning to FIG. 6, the EKB format will be further described. Thesignature is an electronic signature executed, for example, by a keycontrol center, a content provider, a settlement organization or thelike which issued the enabling key block (EKB). The device whichreceived the EKB confirms, by authentication of the signature, that itis an enabling key block (EKB) issued by a valid enabling key block(EKB) issuer,

While in the aforementioned example, only the content key is sent alongwith the EKB, a description will be made hereinafter in which encryptedcontent is also sent.

This is shown in FIGS. 8A and 8B. In FIG. 8A, Enc(Kcon, content) 801 isdata in which content is encrypted by a content key(Kcon), Enc(KEK,Kcon) 802 is data in which a content key (Kcon) is encrypted by acontent key-encryption key (KEK), and Enc(EKB, KEK) 803 is data in whicha content KEK is encrypted by an enabling key block (EKB).

Here, the content key-encryption key (KEK) may be a node key (K000, K00. . . ) or a root key (KR) itself, and may be a key encrypted by a nodekey (K000, K00 . . . ) or a root key (KR).

FIG. 8B shows an example where a plurality of contents are recorded inmedia, which makes use of the same Enc(EKB, KEX) 805. In such a case,the same Enc(EKB, KEK) is not added to each data, but data showing alink to Enc(EKB, KEK) is added to each data.

FIG. 9 shows an example where a content encryption key KEK is a renewalnode key K(t)00 obtained by renewal of the node key K00 shown in FIG. 3.In this case, if in a group surrounded by the dotted line in FIG. 3, thedevice 3 is revoked, for example, due to the leak of a key, data havingan enabling key bock (EKB) shown in FIG. 9 and data into which a contentkey (Kcon) is encrypted by a content key encryption key (KEK=K(t)00),and data into which a content is encrypted by a content key (Kcon) aredistributed to members of the other groups, that is, devices 0, 1, 2whereby the devices 0, 1 and 2 can obtain the content.

The right side in FIG. 9 shows the decrypting procedure in the device 0.The device 0, first, obtains a content key encryption key (KEK=K(t)00)from the received EKR by performing a decrypting process using a leafkey K000 held by itself. Then, the device 0 obtains a content key Kcondecrypted by the key K(t)00, and further carries out decrypting by thecontent key Kcon. The device 0 can use the content as a result of theabove process. The devices 1, 2 are also able to obtain a content keyencryption key (KEK=K(t)00) by processing the EKB in a similar fashionand are able to use the content similarly.

The devices 4, 5, 6 . . . of the other groups shown in FIG. 3 are notable to obtain a content key encryption key (KEK=K(t)00) using a leafkey and a node key held by themselves even if they receive the same EKBas mentioned above. The revoked device 3 is likewise not able to obtainthe content key encryption key (KEK=K(t)00) by a leaf key and a nodekey, and only the device having the proper right is able to decrypt anduse the content.

If the distribution of a content key making use of the EKB is used, in amanner as described, the encrypted content can be distributed safely toonly valid users.

An enabling key block (EKB), a content key, an encrypted content or thelike can be safely distributed through a network, but the enabling keyblock (EKB), the content key and the encrypted content can also bestored in a recording medium such as DVD, CD and provided to a user. Inthis case, content distribution can be further limited by a simplestructure.

FIG. 10 shows an example of constitution in which an enabling key block(EKB) is stored together with an encrypted content in a recordingmedium. In the example shown in FIG. 10, stored in the recording mediumare contents C1 to C4, data associating an enabling key blockcorresponding to each stored content, and an enabling key block ofversion M (EKB_M). For example, EKB_1 is used to produce a content keyKcon1 having a content C1 encrypted, and for example, EKB_2 is used toproduce a content key Kcon2 having a content C2 encrypted. In thisexample, an enabling key block of version M (EKB_M) is stored in arecording medium. Since contents C3, C4 are placed in correspondence tothe enabling key block (EKB_M), the contents C3, C4 can be obtained bydecrypting the enabling key block (EKB_M). Since EKB_1, EKB_2 are notstored in the recording medium, it is necessary to obtain EKB_1, EKB_2by new distribution means, for example, network distribution ordistribution by a recording medium.

FIGS. 11A and 11B show a comparative example between a content keydistribution using EKB and conventional content key distribution where acontent key is circulated among a plurality of devices. FIG. 11A showsthe conventional approach, and FIG. 11B shows an example making use ofan enabling key block (EKB) according to the present invention. In FIGS.11A and 11B, Ka (Kb) indicates data in which Kb is encrypted by Ka.

As shown in FIG. 11A, processing has been heretofore carried out inwhich validity of a data transmit-receiver is confirmed, authenticationprocessing and authentication and key exchange (AKE) are executedbetween devices to co-own a session key, Kses, and a content key Kcon isencrypted by the session key, Kses, under the condition that theauthentication is established to effect transmission.

For example, in the PC shown in FIG. 11A, it is possible to decrypt acontent key, Kcon, encrypted by the session key, Kses, and furtherpossible to encrypt Kcon by a stored key, Kstr, held by the PC itself tostore, Kstr (Kcon) in its own memory.

In FIG. 11A, authentication processing as shown in FIG. 11A is executedso that content keys are encrypted by the respective session keys toeffect distribution even where data is desired to be distributed in theform capable of being used for only a recording device 1101 shown inFIG. 11A. The PC or the reproducing device is likewise able to use asession key produced in the authentication process and co-owned todecrypt an encrypted content key.

On the other hand, in an example making use of an enabling key block(EKB) shown in FIG. 11B, an enabling key block (EKB), and data (Kroot(Kcon)) having a content key Kcon encrypted by a node key or a root keyobtained by processing the enabling key block (EKB) are distributed froma content provider, whereby the content key Kcon can be decrypted andobtained only by the apparatus capable of processing the distributedEKB.

Accordingly, for example, the useable enabling key block (EKB) isproduced only on the right end in FIG. 11B, and the enabling key block(EKB), and data having an encrypted content key Kcon are sent togetherwhereby the PC, the reproducing apparatus or the like present cannotexecute processing of the EKB by a leaf key or node key owned by itself.Accordingly, the useable content key can be distributed to only a validdevice without executing processes such as authentication, theproduction of a session key, and the process for encrypting a contentkey Kcon by the session key as illustrated in FIG. 11A.

Where the useable content key is desired to be distributed to PC, arecording and reproducing unit also, an enabling key block (EKB) capableof being processed is produced and distributed to thereby obtain acommon content key.

In the distribution of data used in the enabling key block (EKB) or akey described above, since an enabling key block (EKB) and a content ora content key which are transferred between devices always maintain thesame encryption form, there is the possibility that an invalid copy isproduced due to the so-called replay attack, which records a datatransmission channel and transfers it again later. For preventing suchan attack as described, there is an effective means for executing anauthentication and key exchange process similar to those of the priorart between data transfer devices. Now, a description is made of anarrangement in which an authentication key, Kake, used when theauthentication process and key exchange process are executed, isdistributed to a device using the aforementioned enabling key block(EKB), whereby the authentication process is in conformity with a commonkey system having a common authentication key as a safe private key.That is, this is an example in which encrypted message data of the EKBis used as an authentication key.

FIG. 12 shows a mutual authentication method (ISO/IEC 9798-2) using acommon key encryption system. While in FIG. 12, DES is used as thecommon key encryption system, other systems may be used as long as theyare the common key encryption system. In FIG. 12, first, B produces therandom number Rb of 64 bits, and Rb and ID (b), which is its own ID, aretransmitted to A. A, which receives them, newly produces the randomnumber Ra of 64 bits, and data (Ra, Rb, ID(b)) are encrypted using a keyKab in the CBC mode of DES and transmitted to B. The key Kab is a key tobe stored in a recording element as a private key common to A and B.According to the encrypting processing by the key Kab using the CBC modeof DES, for example, an initial value and Ra are subjected to anexclusive OR; in the DES encryption part, the key Kab is used forencrypting to generate an encrypted text E1. The encrypted text E1 andRb are subjected to an exclusive OR; in the DES encryption part, a keyKab is used for encrypting to generate encrypted text E2. The encryptedtext E2 and ID (b) are subjected to an exclusive OR; and in the DESencryption part, a key Kab is used for encrypting to generate encryptedtext (Token-AB). The token-AB [E1, E2, E3] is transmitted to B.

B decrypts the received token-AB, a key Kab (authentication key)likewise stored in a recording element as a common private key. First, Bdecrypts encrypted text E1 by authentication key Kab to obtain therandom number Ra. Next, encrypted text E2 is decrypted by authenticationkey Kab, and the result therefrom and E1 are subjected to exclusive ORto obtain Rb. Finally, encrypted text E3 is decrypted by anauthentication key Kab, and the result therefrom and E2 are subjected toexclusive OR to obtain ID (b). B authenticates that A is valid if Ra andID (b) out of Ra, Rb and ID (b) thus obtained are coincided with theones transmitted by B.

Next, B produces a session key (Kses) to be used after authentication(Producing method: To use the random number). Then, Rb, Ra and Kses areencrypted in that order using an authentication key Kab in the CBC modeof DES and are returned to A.

A, which received the above data, decrypts the received data byauthentication key Kab. A decrypting method of the received data issimilar to the decrypting process of B, which is therefore omitted inits detail. A authenticates that B is valid if Rb and Ra out of Rb, Raand Kses thus obtained are coincided with the ones transmitted by A.When passed the authentication. After authentication, the session key,Kses, is used as a common key for secret communication afterauthentication.

Where invalidity is found when the received data are authenticated,processing is interrupted as a failure of mutual authentication.

In the above-described authentication process, A and B co-own a commonauthentication key Kab. The common authentication key Kab is distributedto a device using the enabling block key (EKB).

For example, with reference to FIG. 12, there may be employed thearrangement in which out of A or B, the other encrypts an authenticationkey Kab by an enabling key block (EKB) to transmit it to the other, orthe arrangement in which a third party produces an enabling key bock(EKB) that can be used by both devices A and B for the devices A and Bto encrypt an authentication key Kab by the enabling key block (EKB) todistribute it.

FIGS. 13 and 14 show examples in which an authentication key, Kake,common to a plurality of devices is distributed by an enabling key block(EKB). FIG. 13 shows an example in which a decodable authentication key,Kake, is distributed to devices 0, 1, 2 and 3, and FIG. 14 shows anexample in which the device 3 out of the devices 0, 1, 2 and 3 isrevoked to distribute a decodable authentication key to only the devices0, 1 and 2.

In the example of FIG. 13, a node key K(t)00 is renewed using a node keyand a leaf key in the devices 0, 1, 2, 3 by producing a decodableenabling key block (EKB), along with data (b) having an authenticationkey Kaka decrypted by the renewed node key K(t)00. First, the respectivedevices, as shown on the right side of FIG. 13, processes (decrypts) EKBto thereby obtain a renewed node key K(t)00, and then decrypts anauthentication key: Enc(K(t)00, Kake) encrypted using the obtained nodekey K(t)00 to obtain the authentication key Kake.

In the other devices 4, 5, 6, 7 . . . , even if the same enabling keyblock (EKB) is received, the node key K(t)00 renewed by processing EKBcannot be obtained, and therefore, an authentication key can be sent toonly the valid device safely.

On the other hand, FIG. 14 shows an example in which the device 3 isrevoked. A decodable enabling key block (EKB) is produced with respectto the only other members of the group, that is, the devices 0, 1 and 2for distribution. Data having (a) an enabling key block (EKB) and (b) anauthentication key (Kake) (encrypted by the node key (K(t)00)) aredistributed.

On the right side of FIG. 14, the decrypting procedure is shown. First,the devices 0, 1 and 2 obtain an enabling node key (K(t)00) byperforming a decrypting process using a leaf key or a node key owned byitself from the received enabling key block. Next, the devices obtainthe authentication Key Kake by decrypting Enc(k(t)00,Kake).

The devices 4, 5, 6 . . . in the other group shown in FIG. 3 cannotobtain a renewal node key (K(t)00) using a leaf key and a node key ownedby itself even if similar data (EKB) is received. Similarly, in therevoked device 3, the renewal node key (K(t)00) cannot be obtained by aleaf key and a node key owned by itself. Thus, only the device having avalid right is able to decrypt an authentication key for use.

If distribution of an authentication key making use of an EKB is used,only the valid right holder is able to distribute a decodableauthentication key safely with less data quantity.

In the following, the distribution process of the content key using apublic key authentication and an enabling key block (EKB) will bedescribed. First, a mutual authentication method using an elliptic curveencryption of 160-bit length, which is a public key encryption system,will be described with reference to FIG. 15. In FIG. 15, ECC is used asthe public key encryption system, but any system may be used as long asit is a public key encryption system similar thereto. Further, the keysize need not be 160 bits. In FIG. 15, first, B produces the randomnumber Rb of 64 bits to transmit it to A. A, which received it, newlyproduces the random number Ra of 64 bits, the random number Ak smallerthan the prime number p, and a point Av=Ak×G is obtained (Av is 160bit). An electronic signature A.Sig is produced with respect to Ra, Rb,Av (X coordinate and Y coordinate, each 64 bits), which is returned,along with a public certificate of A, to B. An electronic signaturecomprising up to 448 bits in total is produced.

B, which received the public key certificate, Ra, Rb, Av, and theelectronic signature A.Sig, authenticates if Rb transmitted by A is thesame as the one produced by B. As a result, when they are the same, anelectronic signature within the public key certificate of A isauthenticated by a public key of an authentication office to take out apublic key of A. The electronic signature A.Sig is authenticated usingthe public key of A.

Next, B produces the random number Bk which is smaller than the primenumber p. A point Bv=Bk×G is obtained to produce an electronic signatureB.Sig with respect to Rb, Ra, Bv (X coordinate and Y coordinate), whichis returned to A along with a public key certificate of B.

A, which received the public key certificate, Rb, Ra, Av, and theelectronic signature B.Sig of B authenticates if Ra transmitted by B iscoincided with the one produced by A. As a result, when they are thesame, an electronic signature within the public key certificate of B isauthenticated by a public key of an authentication office to take out apublic key of B. The electronic signature B. Sig is authenticated usingthe public key of B. After the authentication of an electronic signaturehas been succeeded, A authenticates B to be valid.

Where both of them have succeeded in authentication, B computes Bk×Av(since Bk is the random number, but Av is the point on the ellipticcurve, scalar-times computation at the point on the oval curve isnecessary), and A computes Ak×Bv, and uses the lower 64 bits of the Xcoordinate of these points as a session key for use thereafter (where acommon key encryption is of 64 bit key length). Of course, a session keymay be produced from the Y coordinate, and the coordinate need not bethe lower 64 bits. Something in the secret communication after mutualauthentication the transmission data is not only encrypted by a sessionkey but is also applied with an electronic signature.

Where in the authentication of an electronic signature or authenticationof the received data, invalidity is found, processing is interrupted dueto a failure of mutual authentication.

FIG. 16 shows an example of a distribution process of content keys usinga public key authentication and an enabling key block(EKB). First, theauthentication process according to the public key system describedabove is executed between a content provider and a PC. The contentprovider produces a decodable EKB comprising a renewed node key and acontent key encrypted with the renewable key (E(Kcon)). In addition, theEKB and E(Kcon) are encrypted using the session key Kses and transmittedto the PC.

The PC decrypts the received data using the session key, Kses andthereafter transmits it to a reproducing apparatus and a recordingmedium.

The reproducing apparatus and the recording medium receives the renewedkey from the EKB as described earlier to further recover the contentkey, Kcon.

According to the above arrangement, since encrypted data using an EKBare transmitted under the condition of the authentication between acontent provider and PC, for example, even in the case where a node keyis leaked, positive data transmission to a mating party is enabled.

While in the above-described example, a description has been made of amethod for encrypting a content key, an authentication key or the likeusing an enabling key block (EKB) to distribute it, an arrangement inwhich various program codes are distributed using an enabling key block(EKB) may be employed. That is, this is an example in which encryptedmessage data of an EKB is used as a program code.

FIG. 17 shows an example in which a program code is encrypted by arenewal node key of an enabling key block (EKB) to transmit it betweendevices. A device 1701 transmits, to device 1702 an enabling key block(EKB) that can be decrypted by a node key and a leaf key of a device1702, and a program code subjected to decrypting by a renewal node keycontained in the enabling key block (EKB). The device 1702 processes thereceived EKB to obtain the renewal node key, and further executesdecrypting of the program code by the obtained renewal node key.

In the example shown in FIG. 17, further, processing by the program codeobtained in the device 1702 is executed to return the result to thedevice 1701, and the device 1701 further continues processing on thebasis of the result.

As described above, the enabling key block (EKB) and the program code(subjected to decrypting processing by the renewal node key contained inthe enabling key block (EKB)) are distributed whereby a program codecapable of being decrypted in a specific device can be distributed tothe specific device or the group shown in FIG. 3.

Next, a description will be made of the processing arrangement in whichan integrity check value (ICV) is produced to correspond to the content.The presence or absence of the falsification of the content is judged byusing the ICV.

The integrity check value (ICV) is, for example, computed using a hashfunction with respect to the content, and is computed by ICV=hash (Kicv,C1, C2, . . . ). Kicv is an ICV producing key. C1, C2 are contentinformation. A message authentication code (MAC) of content informationis also used.

FIG. 18 shows an example for producing a MAC value using the DESencryption processing arrangement. As shown in FIG. 18, a message isdivided into 8-bit units (hereinafter, the divided messages are M1, M2,. . . MN). First, the initial value (hereinafter, IV) and M1 aresubjected to exclusive OR (the result of which is I1). Next, I1 is putinto a DES encryption part to carry out encrypting using a key(hereinafter, K1) (the output is E1). Continuously, E1 and M2 aresubjected to exclusive OR, the output of which, I2, is put into the DESencryption part, and is encrypted using the key 1 (the output E2).Thereafter, this procedure is repeated, and the encrypting processingapplied to all of the messages. The last EN is the messageauthentication code (MAC).

The hash function is applied to the MAC value of the content and the ICVproducing key to produce the integrity check value (ICV) of the content.An ICV produced for content for which no falsification is assured iscompared with an ICV produced on the basis of new content. If the sameICV is obtained, the fact that the content is not falsified is assured,and if the ICVs are different, a judgment that falsification is presentcan be made.

Next, an arrangement in which the Kicv is sent by the enabling key blockwill be described. That is, this is an example in which encryptedmessage data of an EKB is an integrity check value (ICV) producing key.

FIG. 19 and FIG. 20 show examples in which (where contents common to aplurality of devices are sent) an integrity check value producing keyKicv is distributed by the enabling key block (EKB). FIG. 19 shows anexample in which the Kicv is distributed to devices 0, 1, 2 and 3, andFIG. 20 shows an example in which the device 3 is revoked, and the Kicvis distributed to only the devices 0, 1 and 2.

In the example of FIG. 19, a node key K(t)00 (renewed using a node keyand a leaf key owned by the devices 0, 1, 2 and 3) along with data (b)having a Kicv encrypted by the renewed node key K(t)00 are distributedby producing a decodable enabling key block (EKB). As shown on the rightside in FIG. 19, the respective devices first process (decrypt) the EKBto thereby obtain the renewed node key K(t)00, and subsequently decrypta check value producing key: Enc(K(t)00, Kicv) encrypted using theobtained renewed node key K(t)00 to obtain the check value producing keyKicv.

Since other devices 4, 5, 6, 7 . . . cannot obtain the renewed node keyK(t)00 by processing the EKB by a node key and a leaf key owned bythemselves even if the same enabling key block (EKB) is received, thecheck value producing key, Kicv, can be safely sent to only validdevices.

On the other hand, FIG. 20 is an example in which as a device 3 is, forexample, revoked by leak of a key, in a group surrounded by the dottedframe of FIG. 3. A decodable enabling key block (EKB) is produced fordistribution, with respect to the only other members of the group, thatis, the devices 0, 1 and 2. Data having (a) an enabling key block (EKB)and (b) a check value producing key (Kicv) shown in FIG. 20 encrypted bythe renewed node key (K(t)00) are distributed.

On the right side of FIG. 20, the decrypting procedure is shown. First,the devices 0, 1 and 2 obtain the renewed node key (K(t)00) byperforming a decrypting process using a leaf key or a node key owned byitself from the received enabling key block. Next, the devices obtain acheck value producing key, Kicv, by decrypting Enc (K(t)00, Kicv).

The devices 4, 5, 6 . . . outside the group shown in FIG. 3 cannotobtain the renewed node key (K(t)00) using a leaf key and a node keyowned by themselves even if similar data (EKB) is received. Similarly,also in the revoked device 3, the renewed node key (K(t)00) cannot beobtained by a leaf key and a node key owned by itself. Only a devicehaving a valid right is able to decrypt an authentication key for use.

If distribution of a check value reproducing key making use of an EKB isused, only a valid right holder is able to distribute a decodable checkvalue producing key safely, and with less data overhead.

By using the integrity check value (ICV) of contents as described above,it is possible to eliminate invalid copies of an EKB and encryptedcontents. For example, as shown in FIGS. 21A and 21B, there is a medium0.1 in which a content C1 and a content C2 are stored along with anenabling key block (EKB) that is capable of providing content keys. Thecontent C1 and C2 along with the associated EKB, are copied to a medium2 without modification. The copied content can be used in a devicecapable of decrypting the associated EKBs.

However, in FIG. 21B there is provided an arrangement in which integritycheck values (ICV (C1, C2)) are also stored corresponding to storedcontents. The notation (ICV (C1, C2)) is representative of ICV=hash(Kicv, C1, C2) in which an integrity check value is computed using thehash function on the content C1 and the content C2. As shown in FIG.21B, a content 1 and a content 2 are stored in the medium 1, andintegrity check values (ICV (C1, C2)) produced on the basis of thecontent C1 and the content C2 are stored. Further, a content 1 isproperly stored in the medium 2, and an integrity check values (ICV(C1)) produced on the basis of the content C1 is stored therein. In thisexample it is assumed, that (EKB, content 2) stored in the medium 1 isto be copied to the medium 2. In this process a content check value isnewly produced, ICV (C1, C2). This is obviously different from the valueof Kicv (C1) already stored in the medium 2. In the reproducing devicemedia, ICV checking is executed prior to actually copying (EKB, content2) to medium 2 and a judgment is made if the produced ICV and the storedICV are the same. In this example, the ICVS are not the same and nocopying occurs. If the ICVS had been identical, the copying would bepermitted.

Furthermore, there can be provided an arrangement for enhancing safety,in which the integrity check value (ICV) of the contents is produced onthe basis of data including a counter value. That is, ICV=hash (Kicv,counter+1, C1, C2, . . . ). Here, a counter (counter+1) is incrementedfor every rewrite. It is necessary to store the counter value in asecure memory.

Further, in an arrangement, in which the integrity check value (ICV) ofthe contents cannot be stored in the same medium as the contents, theintegrity check value (ICV) of the contents is stored in a separatemedium.

For example, where contents are stored in media for which no measuresare taken to prevent copies (such as a read only memory or normal MO),there is the possibility that when the integrity check value (ICV) isstored in the same medium, rewriting of the ICV is done by an invaliduser, thus failing to safely maintain the original ICV. In such a case,there can be provided an arrangement in which an ICV is safely stored ina medium on a host machine, and the ICV is used for copy control (forexample, check-in/check-out, move), to thereby enable management of theICV and checking for falsification of contents.

The above arrangement is shown in FIG. 22. In FIG. 22, contents arestored in a medium 2201, which takes no measures for preventing copyingsuch as read only media or normal MO. The integrity check values (ICV)in connection with these contents are stored in a safe media 2202 on ahost machine to which a user is not allowed to get access to preventinvalid rewriting of the integrity check value (ICV) by the user. If, adevice on which media 2201 is mounted executes reproducing of the media2201, a PC or a server, which is a host machine, check the ICV to judgethe propriety of reproducing. Thus, reproducing of an invalid copy canbe prevented.

As described above, encrypted data (e.g., a content key, anauthentication key, an ICV producing key or a program code, data or thelike) are encrypted along with an enabling key block and aredistributed. The EKB comprise keys representing node keys and leaf keysof a hierarchical tree structure as shown in FIG. 3. Now a a descriptionwill be made of an arrangement in which the node and leaves of ahierarchical tree structure are associated with categories.

FIG. 23 shows one example of a category classification scheme for ahierarchical tree structure. In FIG. 23, a root key Kroot 2301 is set onthe uppermost stage of the hierarchical tree structure, a node key 2302is set in the intermediate stage, and a leaf key 2303 is set in thelowest stage. Each device holds a respective individual leaf key, and aseries of node keys from the leaf key to a root key, and the root key.

In this example, each of nodes on the M stage is set as a device settingnode of a specific category. Nodes and leaves lower than the M+1 stageare taken as nodes and leaves in connection with devices contained inthe category thereof with one node in the M stage as a top.

For example, a category [Memory stick (trademark)] is set to node 2305in the M stage of FIG. 23. As a result, nodes and leaves lower than node2305 are now set as nodes or leaves containing various devices using thememory stick.

Further, a stage at a level below several stages from the M stage can beset as a sub-category. For example, node 2306 is set as a node of[Reproducing exclusive-use unit], a sub-category node contained in thecategory of the device using the memory stick. Node 2306 is two stagesbelow the category [memory stick] as shown in the figure. Further, anode 2307 associated with a telephone with a music reproducing functionwould now be contained in the category associated with node 2306 (thereproducing exclusive-use unit) as a sub-category node. Similarly, a[PHS] node 2308 and a [Portable telephone] node 2309 under node 2307would now be contained in the category of the telephone with a musicreproducing function.

Further, the category and sub-categories can be set not only with thekind of devices, but also represents device independent categories. Forexample, as makers, a content provider, a settlement organization or thelike, (these will be generally called entity). For example, if onecategory node is set as a game machine XYZ exclusive-use top node (soldby game machine makers), a node key and a leaf key in the lower stagebelow the top node can be stored in any actual sold game machine XYZ.After which, distribution of encrypted contents, or distribution ofvarious keys, and renewal processing are distributed through an enablingkey block (EKB) comprising node keys and leaf keys below the top nodekey. Thus, data can be distributed only for use by the devices below thetop node.

An arrangement can also be provided in which the node below a set topnode is defined as an associated node of the category or sub-categoriesdefined, whereby makers, a content provider or the controlling top nodein the category stage or sub-category stage independently produce anenabling key block. The EKB can be distributed to the devices belongingto those below the top node, and key renewal can be executed withoutaffecting devices belonging to nodes of other categories not belongingto the top node.

For example, in the tree structure shown in FIG. 24A, a key, forexample, a content key, is to be transmitted to devices a, g, j[associated with leaf nodes Ka, Kg and Kj]. In this regard, a decodableenabling key block (EKB) is produced in the nodes Ka, Kg and Kj anddistributed.

It is also contemplated that, for example, a content key, K(t)con, issubjected to encrypting processing by a renewal root key, K(t)root, todistribute it along with EKB. In this case, the devices a, g, j executeprocessing to decrypt the received EKB using a leaf key and a node keyshown in FIG. 24B to obtain the renewed K(t)root. Once the latter isobtained, each device decrypts Enc (K(t)00, K(t)con to obtain thecontent key.

The arrangement of the enabling key block (EKB) provided in this case isas shown in FIG. 25. The format of the enabling key block EKB shown inFIG. 25 is in accordance with the format of the enabling key block (EKB)explained previously with reference to FIG. 6.

As described before, a device which receives the enabling key block(EKB) sequentially executes decrypting process of the encrypted keys onthe basis of an encrypted key of the enabling key block (EKB) and thetag to obtain a renewal key of an upper node. As can be observed fromFIG. 25, in the enabling key block (EKB), the more the number of stages(depth) from a root to a leaf of a tree, the larger the depth. Inaddition, the number of stages (depth) increases according to the numberof devices (leaf). Thus, the size of an EKB further increases.

An arrangement for reducing the size of an enabling key block (EKB) willbe described below. FIGS. 26A and 26B show an example in which theenabling key block (EKB) is simplified according to the key distributiondevice.

Similar to the example of FIG. 25, a key, for example, a content key istransmitted to devices a, g, j associated with respective leaf nodes. Asshown in FIG. 26A, a new simplified tree is constructed, based on thetree structure shown in FIG. 24B. No branch is present from Kroot toKj—so only one branch will suffice, and from K root to Ka and Kg, a2-branch arrangement is constructed merely by having a branch point atK0.

The enabling key block (EKB) for the renewal key distribution isproduced on the basis of this simplified tree. The tree shown in FIG.26A is a re-constructed hierarchical tree that omits unnecessary nodes.

The enabling key block (EKB) described previously with reference to FIG.25 stores data having all keys from leaf a, g, j to Kroot, but thesimplified EKB stores encrypted data with respect to only the nodes ofthe simplified tree. As shown in FIG. 26B, the tag has a 3-bitstructure. A first bit and a second bit have meaning similar to that ofthe example of FIG. 25, in which if data are present in the directionsof left (L) and right (R), it indicates 0, and if not, 1. A third bit isa bit for indicating whether or not an encrypted key is contained in theEKB, and if data is stored, 1 appears, and if not, 0 appears.

Thus, an enabling key block (EKB) provided for a device (leaf) stored ina data communication network or a memory medium is considerably reducedin size as shown in FIG. 26B, as compared with the EKB shown in FIG. 25.Each device which receives the enabling key block (EKB) shown in FIGS.26A and 26B sequentially decrypts only data in a portion where 1 isstored in the third bit of the tag. For example, the device a decryptsEnc(Ka, K(t)0) by a leaf key Ka to obtain a node key K(t)0, and decryptsencrypted data Enc(K(t)0, K(t)root) by a node key K(t)0 to obtainK(t)root. The device j decrypts encrypted data Enc(Kj, K(t)root) by aleaf key Kj to obtain K(t)root.

As described above, the enabling key block (EKB) is produced using onlya simplified new tree to thereby enable producing an enabling key block(EKR) with less size, whereby the data distribution of the enabling keyblock (EKB) can be executed efficiently.

An arrangement will now be described in which the enabling key block(EKB) produced on the basis of the simplified tree shown in FIGS. 26Aand 26B are further simplified to enable a further reduction of EKB sizeand allow for more efficient processing.

As described above, with reference to FIGS. 26A and 26B a simplifiedtree is constructed by omitting unnecessary nodes. The structure of theenabling key block (EKB) for distributing a renewal key is based on thissimplified tree.

The simplified hierarchical tree shown in FIG. 26A distributes theenabling key block (EKB) shown in FIG. 26B to enable devices a, g and jto obtain the renewal root key Kroot. In processing the enabling keyblock (EKB) of FIG. 26B, the device j is possible to obtain the rootkey, K(T)root, by a one time decrypting process of Enc(Kj, K(t)root).However, the device a and g obtain K(t)0 by first decrypting Enc(Kg,K(t)0), and then decrypting Enc(K(t)0, K(t)root) to finally obtain theroot key K(t)root. That is, devices a and g execute the decryptingprocess twice.

In the simplified, hierarchical tree of FIGS. 26A and 26B, where thenode K0 executes its own control as a control node of lower leaves Kaand Kg, for example, node K0 executes control as a sub-root node. It maybe effective to confirm that the devices a and g obtained the renewalkey. However, where the node K0 does not carry out control of the lowerleaf, or where even if the control is carried out, distribution of arenewal key from an upper node is allowed, the simplified tree shown inFIG. 26A may be further simplified to omit the key of node K0.

FIGS. 27A and 27B show the further simplified tree and a structure ofthe resulting enabling key block (EKB), respectively. It is againassumed a key, for example, a content key, is transmitted to the devicesa, g and j. As shown in FIG. 27A, a simplified tree is constructed inwhich a root Kroot and leaf nodes Ka, Kg and Kj are connected directly.

As shown in FIG. 27A, a further simplified tree with the node K0 omittedfrom the re-constructed hierarchical tree shown in FIG. 26A is produced.The enabling key block (EKB) for distributing a renewal key is producedon the basis of this simplified tree. The tree shown in FIG. 27A isre-constructed merely for directly connecting a decodable leaf and aroot. The enabling key block (EKB) for distributing a renewal key isformed on the basis of a key corresponding to a leaf of there-constructed hierarchical tree.

Although the example of FIG. 27A is an example of the arrangement inwhich a terminal is a leaf, it is possible, in the case of distributingkeys to the uppermost node or a plurality of middle and lower nodes, toproduce the enabling key block (EKB) on the basis of the simplified treein which the uppermost node and the middle and lower nodes are directlyconnected to execute key distribution. As described above, thesimplified tree has a structure in which a top node is directlyconnected to a terminal node or leaf node. In the simplified tree, it ispossible to structure it as a tree having not only two branches from thetop node, but a multi-branch arrangement of not less than three branchesaccording to the number of distribution nodes or leaves.

As described above, the enabling key block (EKB) of FIG. 25 comprisesencrypted data for all keys from each leaf Ka, Kg and Kj to Kroot. Incontrast, the enabling key block (EKB) based on the simplifiedhierarchical tree shown in FIG. 27A omits a key of node K0, andtherefore, the size of the enabling key block (EKB) of FIG. 27B issmaller than that shown in FIG. 25B.

The enabling key block (EKB) shown in FIG. 27B has a tag of 3 bitssimilar to the enabling key block (EKB) shown in FIG. 26B. In the firstand the second bits, if data are present in the directions of left (L)and right (R), it indicates 0, and if not, a 1. A third bit is forindicating whether or not an encrypted key is stored within the EKB, andwhere data is stored, a 1 appears, and if not, a 0 appears.

In the enabling key block (EKB) of FIG. 27B, each device a, g and j mayobtain a root key K(t)root by a one-time decrypting process of Enc(Ka,K(t)root), or Enc(Kg, K(t)root) Enc(Kj, K(t)root).

As described above, the enabling key block (EKB) produced on the basisof a simplified tree in which the uppermost node is directly connectedto a terminal node or a leaf node are formed on the basis of only thekey corresponding to the top node and the terminal node or the leaf nodeof the simplified tree.

As described above, the size of an EKB can be reduced by using asimplified tree as shown in either FIGS. 26A and 26B or FIGS. 27A and27B.

The simplified hierarchical tree structure can be utilized effectively,particularly in the EKB control arrangement in an entity unit describedbelow. An entity is a gathering block of a plurality of nodes or leavesof a tree. The entity is set as the gathering set according to the kindof devices, or set as the gathering of a variety of forms such as aprocessing unit, a control unit, or a service providing unit having acommon point such as control units of a device providing maker, acontent provider, a settlement organization or the like. Devicesclassified into categories are gathered in a single entity. For example,a simplified tree similar to that described above is re-constructed by atop node (sub-roots) of a plurality of entities to produce an EKBthereby. This makes it possible to produce and distribute the decodablesimplified enabling key block (EKB) belonging to the selected entity.The control structure of the entity unit will be described in detaillater.

Such an enabling key block (EKB) as described above can be stored in aninformation recording medium such as an optical disk, DVD or the like.For example, an information recording medium stores an EKB and encryptedmessage data encrypted by a renewal node key that is stored in anenabling key bock (EKB). The EKB comprises the aforementioned encryptedkey data and a tag part as position discrimination data for theassociated hierarchical tree structure. A destination devicesequentially extracts and decrypts the encrypted key data contained inthe stored enabling key block (EKB) in accordance with thediscrimination data of the tag part. Of course, there can be employed anarrangement in which the enabling key block (EKB) is distributed througha network such as an internet.

Next, a description will be made of an arrangement in which a node or aleaf of a tree is controlled by a block as a gathering of a plurality ofnodes or leaves. The block as the gathering of a plurality of nodes orleaves will be hereinafter called an “entity.” The entity is set as thegathering set according to the kind of devices or as the gathering ofvarious forms such as a processing unit, a jurisdiction unit or aservice providing unit having a common point such as device providingmakers, a content provider or a settlement organization.

The entity will be described with reference to FIGS. 28A to 28C. FIG.28A is a view for explaining the control arrangement of an entity unitof a tree. One entity is shown as a triangle in the figure. For example,a plurality of nodes are contained in one entity 2701. FIG. 28B showsthe node structure within the entity 2701. The entity 2701 comprises aplurality of 2-branch type trees with one node as a top. The top node2702 of entity 2701 will be hereinafter called a sub-root.

The terminal of the tree are represented by leaves as shown in FIG. 28C.Each terminal is a device. The device belongs to any entity of a treehaving a top node which is a sub-root.

As can be observed from FIG. 28A, an entity has a hierarchicalstructure. This hierarchical structure will be described with referenceto FIGS. 29A to 29C.

FIG. 29A is a view for explaining the hierarchical structure in asimplified form. Entities A01 to Ann are several stages below Kroot,entities B01 to Bnk are set below the entities A1 to An, and entities C1to Cnq are set thereunder. Each entity has a tree shape comprising nodesand leaves, as shown in FIGS. 29B and 29C.

For example, the arrangement of the entity Bnk has a plurality of nodesto a terminal node 2812, and a sub-root 2811 as a top node. This entityhas a discriminator Bnk, and the entity Bnk independently executes nodekey control corresponding to a node within the entity Bnk to therebyexecute control of a lower (child) entity set with the terminal node2812 as the top node. On the other hand, the entity Bnk is under the(host) entity Ann wherein the sub-root 2811 is a terminal node of entityAnn.

The arrangement of entity Cn3 has a plurality of nodes and leaves asshown in FIG. 29C of which node 2852 is a terminal node and sub-root2851 is a top node. This entity has a discriminator Cn3, the entity Cn3independently executes control of a node key and a leaf key within theentity Cn3 to thereby execute control of a leaf (device) correspondingto the terminal node 2852. On the other hand, the entity Cn3 is underthe (host) entity Bn2, wherein the sub-root 2851 is a terminal nodethereof. The key control in each entity is, for example, a key renewingprocess, a revoke process and the like, which will be described indetail later.

A device, which is a leaf of the lowest entity, stores a node key ofeach node and a corresponding leaf key positioned in a pass from theleaf key of the device to a sub-root node, which is a top node of theentity to which the device belongs. For example, the device of theterminal node 2852 stores keys from the terminal node (leaf) 2852 to thesub-root node 2851.

An entity will be further described with reference to FIGS. 30A and 30B.The entity is able to have a tree structure having by a variety of stagenumbers. The stage number, that is, the depth, can be set according tothe number of child entities corresponding to the terminal node (or leafnode (device)) controlled by the entity.

An arrangement of host and child entities is shown in FIG. 30A and FIG.30B, The root entity is an entity in the uppermost stage having a rootkey. Entities A, B, C are set as a plurality of child entities in theterminal node of the root entity, and an entity D is set as a childentity of entity C. An entity (e.g., C2901) has not less than oneterminal node as a sub-node (e.g., node 2950). Entity control may beincreased. For example, an entity C′2902 having plural stages of treesis newly installed with a reserve node 2950 as a top node to therebyprovide control of terminal nodes 2970. As can be observed, and a childentity can be added to a terminal node.

A reserve node will be further described with reference to FIG. 31.Entity A, 3011, controls child entities B, C, D . . . , and has onereserve node 3021. Where it is desired to increase the number of childentities that are controlled, a child entity e.g., A′, 3012, is set tothe reserve node, e.g., 3021. Similarly, child entities F and G to becontrolled can be further set to the terminal node of the child entityA′, 3012. Also in the child entity A′, 3012, at least one of theterminal nodes is set as a reserve node 3022 whereby another childentity e.g., A″3013 can be further set. One, or more, reserve nodes aresecured also in the terminal node of the child entity A″3013. This useof reserve nodes allows child entities to be increased endlessly. Withrespect to the reserve node, not only one terminal node but a pluralityof nodes may be set as a reserve node.

In the respective entities, the enabling key block (EKB) is formed inthe entity unit, and key renewing and revoke processing are to beexecuted in the entity unit. As shown in FIG. 31, the enabling key block(EKB) of an individual entity is set to a plurality of entities A, A′,A″, but these can be collectively controlled, for example, by devicemakers who controls the entities A, A′, A″ in common.

Next, the registration process of new entities will be described. FIG.32 shows a registration processing sequence. A newly added (child)entity(N-En) provides a request for a new registration to a host entity(P-En). Each entity holds a public key in accordance with a public keyencryption system, and a new entity sends its own public key to the hostentity (P-En) when a registration request is made.

The host entity (P-En), which receives the registration request,transfers the received public key of the new (child) entity to acertificate authority (CA) and receives back a public key certificatefor the new (child) entity (N-En) to which a signature of CA is added.These procedures are carried out as a procedure for mutualauthentication between the host entity (P-En) and the new (child) entity(N-En).

When the authentication procedure is successfully terminated, the hostentity (P-En) transmits a node key (of the new (child) entity (N-En)) tothe new (child) entity (N-En). This node key is a node key of theterminal node of the host entity (P-En) which corresponds to a top nodeof the new (child) entity (N-En), that is, a sub-root key.

When the transmission of the node key is finished, the new (child)entity (N-En) constructs the tree structure of the new (child) entity(N-En), sets a sub-root key of a top node received to a top of theconstructed tree, and sets node and leaf keys to produce an enabling keyblock (EKB) within the entity. The enabling key block (EKB) within oneentity is called a sub-EKB.

On the other hand, the host entity (P-En) produces the sub-EKB withinthe host entity(P-En) to which is added a terminal node to be enabled bythe addition of the new (child) entity (N-En).

When the sub-EKB comprises a node key and a leaf key within the new(child) entity (N-En) is produced, the new (child) entity (N-En)transmits it to the host entity (P-En).

The host entity (P-En) which receives the sub-EKB from the new (child)entity (N-En) transmits the received sub-EKB and a renewal sub-EKB ofthe host entity (P-En) to a key distribute center (KDC).

The key distribute center (KDC) is able to produce various EKBs, thatis, an EKB that can be decrypted merely by a specific entity or deviceon the basis of sub-EKBs of all entities. An EKB to which such adecodable entity or device is set is distributed, for example, to acontent provider, who encrypts a content key on the basis of the EKB todistribute it through a network or store it in a recording medium, thusenabling distribution of a content for use by a specific device.

The registration processing with respect to the key distribute center(KDC) of the sub-EKB of the new entity is not limited to a method forsequentially transferring the sub-EKB through the host entity. Forexample, the processing for registering the sub-EKB in the keydistribute center (KDC) can be performed directly from the newregistration entity without the intervention of the host entity. Thecorrespondence of the host entity to a newly added child entity will bedescribed with reference to FIG. 33. One terminal node 3201 of the hostentity serves as a top node of the newly added child entity, whereby thechild entity is added as an entity under the control of the host entity.This control includes the ability to perform remote processing withrespect to the child.

As shown in FIG. 33, when a new entity is set to the host entity, onenode of a terminal node (e.g., node 3201), which is a leaf node of thehost entity and a top node (e.g., node 3202) of the newly added entityare set as equal nodes. That is, a terminal node, which is a leaf nodeof the host node, is set as a sub-root of the newly added entity. Bybeing so set, the newly added entity is enabled under the whole treestructure.

FIGS. 34A and 34B show examples of a renewal EKB that is produced by thehost entity when the newly added entity is set. FIG. 34A shows anexample of a sub-EKB produced by the host entity when a new entity isadded to terminal node (node 100) 3303 of the host entity. In thearrangement shown in FIG. 34A, the host entity has a terminal node (node000) 3301 and a terminal node (node 001) 3302.

The sub-EKB has the form as shown in FIG. 34B. The sub-EKB comprises ahost node key (encrypted by a terminal node which has been effectivelypresent), a further host node key (encrypted by a host node key), . . .and a sub-root key. Similar to FIG. 34B, each entity has and controls anEKB that is structured to have a host node encrypted by an effectiveterminal node or leaf key, a further host node key encrypted by a hostnode key, and a sub-root key.

Next, a description will be made of the revoke processing of a device oran entity in an arrangement in which the key distribution tree structureis controlled as an entity unit. As described earlier with respect toFIGS. 3 and 4, it is possible to revoke a device and distribute an EKBthat is only decodable by the valid destination device. The revokeprocessing described with respect to FIGS. 3 and 4 is the processing forrevoking a specific device out of the whole tree. However, entitycontrol makes it possible to execute revoke processing for every entity.

A description will be made hereinafter of revoke processing with respectto entity control with reference to FIGS. 35A to 35D and drawingscontinuous thereto.

FIG. 35A shows the key distribution tree structure comprising entities.A root node is set to the uppermost part of the tree to which arecoupled entities A01 to Ann. Entities B01 to Bnk are below the entitiesA01 to Ann, and the lowest stage comprises entities C1 to Cn. In thelowest entity, the terminal nodes (leaves) are individual devices, forexample, a recording and reproducing unit, a reproducing exclusive-useunit or the like. The revoke processing is independent in each entity.For example, in the entities C1 to Cn, the revoke processing of a deviceis executed. FIG. 35B shows the tree structure of an entity Cn, 3430,which is one of the entities in the lowest stage. The entity Cn, 3430,has a top node 3431, and leaves (terminal nodes) associated with aplurality of devices.

Assume that a device is to be revoked, for example, a device 3432 of theentity Cn 3430. The latter produces an enabling key block (sub-EKB)having a node key and a leaf key in the independently renewed entity Cn.This enabling key block is a key block comprising an encrypted key thatcannot be decrypted in the revoked device 3432. A controller of theentity Cn produces this renewed sub-EKB. The renewed sub-EKB comprisesan encrypted key which renews node keys of nodes 3431, 3434, and 3435 onthe path from the sub-root to revoked device 3432. As such only a leafdevice other than the revoked device 3432 can decrypt the renewalsub-EKB. This processing corresponds to the processing described inassociation with FIGS. 3 and 4.

The enabling key block (sub-EKB) renewed by the entity Cn, 3430 istransmitted to the host entity. In this case, the host entity is anentity Bnk, 3420, in which terminal node 3431 serves as the top node ofthe entity Cn, 3430.

The entity Bnk, 3420, receives the enabling key block(sub-EKB) from thechild entity Cn, 3430, sets the terminal node 3431 of the entity Bnk,3420, (corresponding to the top node 3431 of the entity Cnk, 3430contained in the key block) to a key renewed in the child entity Cn,3430, and executes the renewal processing of sub-EKB for itself. FIG.35C shows the tree of entity Bnk, 3420. In the entity Bnk, 3420, a nodekey to be renewed is a node key on a path from the sub-root 3421 in FIG.35C to the terminal node 3431, which is associated with the entitycontaining the revoked device. In this example, node keys of the nodes3421, 3424, and 3425. These node keys are renewed to produce a newrenewal sub-EKB of the entity Bnk, 3420.

Further, the enabling key block (sub-EKB) renewed by the entity Bnk,3420 is transmitted to the host entity. In this case, the host entity isthe entity Ann, 3410, in which terminal node 3421 serves as the top nodeof the entity Bnk, 3420.

The entity Ann, 3410, receives the enabling key block (sub-EKB) from thechild entity Bnk, 3420, sets the terminal node 3421 of the entity Ann,3410 (corresponding to the top node 3421 of the entity Bnk, 3420contained in the key block) to a key renewed in the child entity Bnk,3420, and executes the renewal processing of sub-EKB for itself. FIG.35D shows the tree of entity Ann, 3410. In the entity Ann, 3410, nodekeys to be renewed are node keys 3411, 3414, 3415 on a path from thesub-root 3411 in FIG. 35D to the terminal node 3421, which is associatedwith the entity containing the revoked device. These node keys arerenewed to produce a new renewal sub-EKB of the entity Ann, 3410.

These processes sequentially execute in the host entity to the rootentity described in association with FIG. 30B. The revoke processing ofdevices is completed by a series of processes as described. The sub-EKBrenewed in the entity is finally transmitted to the key distributecenter (KDC) and stored therein. The key distribute center (KDC)produces various EKBs on the basis of the renewal sub-EKB of allentities. The renewal EKB is an encrypted key block that cannot bedecrypted by the revoked device.

FIG. 36 shows a revoked process sequenceFirst, the device control entity(D-En) in the lowest stage of the tree carries out a key renewalnecessary for revoking a leaf in the device control entity (D-En) toproduce a new sub-EKB of the device control entity (D-En). The sub-EKBis sent to the host entity. The host entity (P1-En), which received therenewal sub-EKB (D), produces a renewal sub-EKB (P1) in which a terminalnode key (corresponding to a renewal top node of the renewed sub-EKB(D)) is renewed along with node keys on a pass from the terminal node tothe sub-root. These processes are sequentially executed in the hostentity, and all sub-EKBs finally renewed are stored and controlled bythe key distribute center (KDC).

FIGS. 37A and 37B show an example of an enabling key block (EKB) to beproduced as a result of revoking a device.

FIGS. 37A and 37B are views for explaining an example of an EKB producedin the host entity, which received a renewal sub-EKB from a child entitycontaining a revoked device. In FIG. 37A, a top node of the child entitycontaining the revoked device corresponds to a terminal node (node 100)3601 of the host entity.

The host entity renews those node keys that are present in a pass (path)from the sub-root of the host entity to the terminal node (node 100)3601 to produce a new renewed sub-EKB. The renewed sub-EKB is as shownin FIG. 37B. A renewed key is shown in FIG. 37B with an underline and[′] attached thereto.

Next, revoke processing of entity will be described.

FIG. 38A shows a key distribution tree structure under entity control. Aroot node is set to the uppermost part of the tree, and entities A01 toAnn have several stages thereunder. In particular, entities B01 to Bnkrepresent the stage below entities A01 to Ann, and entities C1 to cnrepresent the stage below entities B01 to Bnk. In the lowest entity, theterminal node (leaf) is an individual device, for example, such asrecording and reproducing unit, a reproducing exclusive-use unit or thelike.

Now, a description is made of the situation in which the revokeprocessing is carried out with respect to the entity Cn, 3730. Theentity Cn, 3730 has a top node 3731, and a plurality of devices areprovided on leaves (terminal nodes), as shown in FIG. 38B.

The revoking of the entity Cn, 3730, provides the ability to revoke alldevices belonging to the entity Cn, 3730 from the tree structure. Therevoke processing of the entity Cn, 3730 is executed in the entity Bnk,3720, which is the host entity of the entity Cn, 3730. The entity Bnk,3720, is an entity in which a terminal node 3731 is a top node of theentity Cn, 3730.

Where revoking of the child entity Cn, 3730 is executed, the entity Bnk,3720 renews a terminal node 3731 of the entity Bnk, 3720, correspondingto the top node 3731 of the entity Cnk, 3730, and further carries outrenewing of node keys on a path from the revoked entity 3730 to thesub-root of the entity Bnk, 3720, to produce a renewed sub-EKB. That is,nodes 3721, 3724, 3725 and 3731 are objects to be renewed. These nodekeys are renewed to produce a new renewed sub-EKB of the entity Bnk,3720.

Alternatively, in performing revocation in a child entity, Cn, 3730, theentity Bnk, 3720 does not renew the terminal node 3731 corresponding tothe top node of the entity Cnk, 3730, and only renews nodes 3721, 3724,and 3731 to produce a renewal sub-EKB.

Further, the enabling key block (sub-EKB) renewed by the entity Bnk,3720 is transmitted to the host entity. In this case, the host entity isan entity Ann, 3710, which is an entity having a top node 3721 of theentity Bnk, 3720 as a terminal node.

When an enabling key bock (sub-EKB) is received from the child entityBnk, 3720, the entity Ann, 3710, sets the terminal node, 3721, of theentity Ann, 3710, (corresponding to the top node 3721 of the entity Bnk,3720) to a key renewed in the child entity Bnk, 3720 and executesrenewal processing of the sub-EKB for itself. FIG. 38D shows the treestructure of the entity Ann, 3710. In the entity Ann, 3710, the node keyto be renewed is a node key of each node 3711, 3714, and 3715constituting a path from the sub-root 3711 to the node 3721 of theentity having transmitted the renewal sub-EKB. These node keys arerenewed to produce a new renewal sub-EKB of the entity Ann, 3710.

These processes are sequentially executed in the host entity describedwith reference to FIG. 30B, above. The revoke processing is completed bya series of processes. The sub-EKB renewed in the respective entity isfinally transmitted to the key distribute center (KDC) and stored. Thekey distribute center (KDC) produces various EKBs on the basis of therenewal sub-EKB of all entities. The renewal EKB is an encrypted keyblock that cannot be decrypted by the device belonging to the entityrevoked.

FIG. 39 shows a revoke processing sequence for an entity. First, theentity control entity (E-En) produces a renewed sub-EKB which revokes aterminal node. The renewed sub-EKB is sent to the host entity. The hostentity (P1-En), which received the renewed sub-EKB, produces a renewedsub-EKB (P1) in which a terminal node key (corresponding to a renewaltop node of the entity (E-En)) is renewed and node keys on a path fromthe terminal node to the sub-root are also renewed. These processes aresequentially executed in the host entity, and all sub-EKBs finallyrenewed are stored and controlled by the key distribute center (KDC).The key distribute center (KDC) produces various EKB on the basis of therenewal EKB of all entities. The renewal EKB is an encrypted key blockthat cannot be decrypted by a device belonging to a revoked entity.

FIG. 40 is a view illustrating the correspondence of a revoked childentity to the host entity which carried out the revoking process. Inperforming the revoking process, the host entity renews terminal node3901 and also renews those node keys that are present in a path from theterminal node 3901 to the sub-root in the tree of the host entity toproduce a new sub-EKB. As a result, the node key of the top node 3902 ofthe revoked child entity does not coincide with the node key of theterminal node 3901 of the host entity. After revoking of the entity, anEKB produced by the key distribute center (KDC) is produced on the basisof the renewed terminal node. Therefore, the device corresponding to theleaf of the child entity not holding the renewal key is disabled fromdecrypting those subsequent EKBs produced by the key distribute censer(KDC).

While in the foregoing, the revoking process has been described in thecontext of revoking the entity in the lowest stage, processing for anentity in the middle stage of the tree is also enabled by a similarprocess. By revoking an entity in the middle stage, a plurality ofentities and devices belonging to lower levels of the tree can becollectively revoked.

As described above, the process for revoking an entity is similar tothat for revoking a single device.

Next, a description will be made of a processing arrangement in whichcontent distribution is carried out by an entity in accordance with acapability. The term “capability” refers to, for example, a defined dataprocessing ability of a device. For example, whether decrypting ofspecific compressed voice data is enabled, whether a specific voicereproducing system is enabled, whether specific image processing programcan be performed, or whether a device is capable of processing a contentor a program.

FIG. 41 shows an example of an entity arrangement which has definedcapabilities. This is a tree in which a root node is positioned at theuppermost top of the key distribution tree, a plurality of entities areconnected to the lower layer, and each node has a 2-branch. Here, forexample, an entity 4001 is defined as an entity having the capability toenable either voice reproducing systems A, B or C.

Similarly, entity 4002, entity 4003, entity 4004, and entity 4005 arerespectively defined as entities having the capability of using voicereproducing system B or C, voice reproducing system A or B, voicereproducing system B, and voice reproducing system C, respectively.

On the other hand, an entity 4021 is defined as an entity having thecapability to enable image reproducing systems p, q and r. An entity4022 and an entity 4023 are respectively defined as entities having thecapability to use image reproducing system p.

The capability information of the entities as described is controlled inthe key distribute center (KDC). For example, where a content providerdesires to distribute music data compressed by a specific compressionprogram to various devices, an enabling key block (EKB) (decodable withrespect to only the device which can reproduce the specific compressionprogram) can be produced on the basis of the capability information ofeach entity. The content provider distributes a content key encrypted bythe enabling key block (EKB), which is produced on the basis of thecapability information, and also distributes compressed voice dataencrypted by the content key to the devices. As such, it is possible toaccurately provide data only to a device capable of processing thatdata.

While in FIG. 41, it is noted that it is not necessary to define thecapability information with respect to all the entities, but, as shownin FIG. 42, capability may be defined with respect to only the entity inthe lowest stage to which the device belongs. The capability of thedevice belonging to the entity in the lowest stage is controlled in thekey distribute center (KDC), and the enabling key block (EKB) isproduced on the basis of capability information defined in the entity inthe lowest stage. FIG. 42 shows an arrangement in which the capabilityin entity 4101, is defined at the terminal node for which the device isassociated. The capabilities with respect to these entities iscontrolled in the key distribute center (KDC). For example, to theentity 4101 belong devices capable of processing a system B with respectto voice reproducing and a system r with respect to image reproducing,respectively. To the entity 4102 belong devices capable of processing asystem A with respect to voice reproducing and a system q with respectto image reproducing, respectively.

FIGS. 43A and 43B show an example of a capability control tablecontrolled in the key distribute center (KDC). Each row of thecapability control table comprises a capability test, an entity ID, anEKB, and sub-root information. In the capability list, for example, if avoice data reproducing processing system (A) can be processed, [1]appears, if not, [0] appears, and if a voice data reproducing processingsystem (B) can be processed, [1] appears, if not, [0] appears. Themethod of setting capability is not limited to such a form as described,but other arrangements may be employed.

For each capability test, corresponding entity ID, sub-EKB (which may bestored in a separate data base), and sub-root information is stored.

In the key distribute center (KDC), EKBs are produced such that onlydevices capable of reproducing specific content can decode therespective enabling key block (EKB)s. The processing for producing theenabling key block on the basis of capability information will bedescribed with reference to FIG. 44.

First, in Step S4301, the key distribute center (KDC) selects thoseentities having the designated capability from the capability controltable. For example, where a content provider desires to distributereproducible data on the basis of the voice data reproducing processingsystem A, an entity, is selected from the capability control table ofFIG. 43A in which the corresponding bit on the capability listassociated with voice data producing processing system A is set to [1].

Next, in Step S4302, a list of those selected entity IDs is produced.Next, in Step S4303, a path necessary for a tree comprising the selectedentity ID is selected. In Step 4304, a check is made to determine if allpaths have been selected.

When all path selections are completed, the procedure proceeds to StepS4305 to form a key distribution tree structure for the selectedentities.

Next, in Step S4306, renewing of node keys of the tree structureproduced in Step S4305 is carried out to produce renewed node keys.Further, the sub-EKB information of the selected entities is taken outof the capability control table, and an enabling key block (EKB) isproduced on the basis of the sub-EKB and the renewed node key producedin Step S4306. The enabling key block (EKB) thus produced is utilizedonly in the device having the specific capability. For example, acontent key is encrypted by the enabling key block (EKB), and contentcompressed on the basis of a specific program in the content key isdistributed to the device, whereby the content is utilized only in thespecific device selected by the key distribute center (KDC).

As described above, in the key distribute center (KDC), the capabilitycontrol table is used to select only those devices capable ofreproducing the specific content and only those selected devices candecode the enabling key block (EKB). Accordingly, where a new entity isregistered, it is necessary to obtain the capability of a newlyregistered entity. This process will be described with reference to FIG.45.

FIG. 45 shows a sequence for providing capability notice for a newentity.

The new (child) entity (N-En) added to the tree executes a newregistration request with respect to the hose entity (P-En). Each entityholds a public key in accordance with the public key encryption system,and the new entity sends its own public key to the host entity (P-En)when the registration request takes place.

The host entity (P-En) which received the registration request,transfers the received public key of the new (child) entity (N-En) tothe certificate authority (CA), and receives therefrom a public key ofthe new (child) entity (N-En) to which a signature of CA is added. Theseprocedures are carried out as the procedure of mutual authenticationbetween the host entity (P-En) and the new (child) entity (N-En).

When the authentication of the new registration request entity isfinished, the host entity (P-Ne) grants the registration of the new(child) entity (N-En) and transmits a node key of the new (child) entity(N-En) to the new (child) entity (N-En). This node key is one node keyof the terminal node of the host entity (P-En) and corresponds to a topnode of the new (child) entity (N-En), that is, a sub-root key.

When transmission of this node key is finished, the new (child) entity(N-En) constructs the tree of the new (child) entity (N-En), sets thesub-root key to the top of the constructed tree, sets keys of each nodeand leaf, and produces the enabling key block (sub-EKB) in the entity.On the other hand, the host entity (P-En) also produces the sub-EKB inthe host entity (P-En) to which is added a terminal node resulting fromthe addition of the new (child) entity (N-En).

When the new (child) entity (N-En) produces the sub-EKB, the new (child)entity (N-En) transmits it to the host entity (P-En), and furtherprovides to the host entity capability information in connection withdevices controlled by entity (N-En).

The host entity (P-En), which received the sub-EKB and the capabilityinformation from the new (child) entity (N-En), transmits the receivedsub-EKB, the received capability information, and the renewed sub-EKB ofthe host entity (P-En) to the key distribute center (KDC).

The key distribute center (KDC) registers the received sub-EKB andreceived capability information of the new entity in the capabilitycontrol table described with reference to FIGS. 43A and 43B, and renewsthe capability control table. The key distribute center (KDC) canproduce various forms of EKBs, that is, an EKB that can be decryptedonly by the entity having a specific capability or device.

The present invention has been described in detail with reference to thespecific embodiments. However, it is obvious that those skilled in artmay amend or replace the embodiments within the scope not departing fromthe subject matter of the present invention. That is, the presentinvention has been disclosed in the form of illustration and should notbe interpreted narrowly. For judging the subject matter of the presentinvention, reference should be made to the claims described hereinafter.

As described above, according to the information processing system andmethod according to the present invention, in the production of anenabling key block (EKB) (that can be applied as the encryptingprocessing key block such as a content key, an authentication key, acontent check value producing key, a program data or the like), thehierarchical key distribution tree is reconstructed according to thedistribution device, and the enabling key block (EKB) is produced on thebasis of the node and leaf contained in a simplified tree. Therefore, aconsiderable reduction in the size of the enabling key block (EKB) isrealized.

Further, according to the information processing system and methodaccording to the present invention, the enabling key block (EKB) isformed on the basis of a simplified tree, and data is contained in a tagas a position discriminator of encrypted key data in the EKB. Therefore,a considerable reduction in data quantity of the EKB is realized, andextraction of encrypted key data using a tag in the device whichreceived the EKB is facilitated to make the EKB decrypting process inthe device more effective.

1. A device for use in an information processing system that distributesencrypted message data, the device comprising: a receiver for receivingthe encrypted message data and an enabling key block (EKB), the EKBincluding encrypted keys and a tag, the encrypted keys including atleast one renewed key and the tag including position discrimination datathat associates each of the encrypted keys with nodes and leaves of ahierarchical tree structure; a memory for storing a key set, the key setincluding at least one key corresponding to a node or leaf of thehierarchical tree structure; and an encryption processor operable to (a)decrypt the encrypted keys of the received EKB using the stored key setand the position discrimination data of the received EKB to recover theat least one renewed key and (b) decrypt the received encrypted messageusing the at least one recovered renewed key, the encrypted keys of theEKB including keys corresponding to a simplified tree structure, thesimplified tree structure being constructed from the hierarchical treestructure by selecting one or more paths between a top node and an endpoint node or a leaf of the hierarchical tree structure and notincluding one or more unnecessary nodes being in the selected one ormore paths, such that the encrypted keys of the EKB do not include a keycorresponding to the one or more unnecessary nodes in the selected oneor more paths.
 2. The device of claim 1, wherein the at least onerenewed key is associated with a predetermined node of the hierarchicaltree structure and is encrypted using a key associated with a node orleaf of the hierarchical tree structure which is subordinate to thepredetermined node.
 3. The device of claim 1, wherein the encrypted keysof the EKB comprise only keys corresponding to a node or leaf of asimplified tree structure, the simplified tree structure beingconstructed by selecting only paths between a top node and a terminalnode or leaf of the hierarchical tree structure, and wherein theposition discrimination data of the EKB indicates whether an encryptedkey corresponding to a node is included in the EKB.
 4. The device ofclaim 1, wherein the encryption processor is operable to sequentially(a) extract the encrypted keys from the received EKB using the positiondiscrimination data from the tag, (b) decrypt the extracted encryptedkeys to obtain the renewed key, and (c) decrypt the received encryptedmessage using the renewed key.
 5. The device of claim 1, wherein theencrypted message data represents a content key that can be used as adecryption key for decrypting encrypted content.
 6. The device of claim1, wherein the encrypted message data represents an authentication keyused in an authentication process.
 7. The device of claim 1, wherein theencrypted message data represents a key for generating an integritycheck value (ICV) of content.
 8. The device of claim 1, wherein theencrypted message data represents program code.
 9. The device of claim1, wherein the encrypted keys of the EKB comprise only keyscorresponding to a node or leaf of a simplified tree structure, thesimplified tree structure being constructed from the hierarchical treestructure by selecting only paths between a top node and a terminal nodeor leaf of the hierarchical tree structure, and wherein the positiondiscrimination data of the EKB further indicates whether an encryptedkey corresponding to a predetermined node is included in the EKB and, ifincluded, the position discrimination data indicates whether thatencrypted key is at a left or right node position of the simplified treestructure which is subordinate to the predetermined node.
 10. The deviceof claim 9, wherein the simplified tree structure comprises a sub-rootthat is a top node of an entity.
 11. The device of claim 1, wherein theencrypted keys of the EKB comprise only keys corresponding to a top nodeand a terminal node of a simplified tree structure, the simplified treebeing constructed from the hierarchical tree structure by selecting onlypaths between the top node and the terminal node of the hierarchicaltree structure, and wherein the position discrimination data of the EKBindicates whether an encrypted key corresponding to a node is includedin the EKB.
 12. The device of claim 11, wherein the simplified treestructure is a tree having not less than three branches connecting thetop node with the terminal node.
 13. An information processing system,comprising: means for receiving encrypted message data and an enablingkey block (EKB), the EKB including encrypted keys and a tag, theencrypted keys including at least one renewed key and the tag includingposition discrimination data that associates each of the encrypted keyswith nodes and leaves of a hierarchical tree structure; means forstoring a key set, the key set including at least one key correspondingto a node or leaf of the hierarchical tree structure; and means fordecrypting the encrypted keys of the received EKB using the stored keyset and the position discrimination data of the received EKB to recoverthe at least one renewed key and for decrypting the received encryptedmessage using the at least one recovered renewed key, the encrypted keysof the EKB including keys corresponding to a simplified tree structure,the simplified tree structure being constructed from the hierarchicaltree structure by selecting one or more paths between a top node and anend point node or a leaf of the hierarchical tree structure and notincluding one or more unnecessary nodes being in the selected one ormore paths, such that the encrypted keys of the EKB do not include a keycorresponding to the one or more unnecessary nodes in the selected oneor more paths.
 14. The information processing system according to claim13, wherein the at least one renewed key is associated with apredetermined node of the hierarchical tree structure and is encryptedusing a key associated with a node or leaf of the hierarchical treestructure which is subordinate to the predetermined node.
 15. Theinformation processing system according to claim 13, wherein theencrypted keys of the EKB comprise only keys corresponding to a node orleaf of a simplified tree structure, the simplified tree structure beingconstructed by selecting only paths between a top node and a terminalnode or leaf of the hierarchical tree structure and wherein the positiondiscrimination data of the EKB indicates whether an encrypted keycorresponding to a node is included in the EKB.
 16. The informationprocessing system according to claim 13, wherein the encrypted keys ofthe EKB comprise only keys corresponding to a node or leaf of asimplified tree structure, the simplified tree structure beingconstructed from the hierarchical tree structure by selecting only pathsbetween a top node and a terminal node or leaf of the hierarchical treestructure, and wherein the position discrimination data of the EKBfurther indicates whether an encrypted key corresponding to apredetermined node is included in the EKB and, if included, the positiondiscrimination data indicates whether that encrypted key is at a left orright node position of the simplified tree structure which issubordinate to the predetermined node.
 17. The information processingsystem according to claim 13, wherein the decrypting means sequentially(a) extracts the encrypted keys from the received EKB using the positiondiscriminates data from the tag, (b) decrypts the extracted encryptedkeys to obtain the renewed key, and (c) decrypts the received encryptedmessage using the renewed key.
 18. An information processing method foruse in decrypting encrypted message data, the method comprising:receiving an enabling key block (EKB) including encrypted keys and atag, the encrypted keys including at least one renewed key and the tagincluding position discrimination data that associates each of theencrypted keys with nodes and leaves of a hierarchical tree structure;extracting the encrypted keys from the received EKB in accordance withthe positional discrimination data from the tag; and decrypting theextracted encrypted keys to obtain the at least one renewed key, theencrypted keys of the EKB including keys corresponding to a simplifiedtree structure, the simplified tree structure being constructed from thehierarchical tree structure by selecting one or more paths between a topnode and an end point node or a leaf of the hierarchical tree structureand not including one or more unnecessary nodes being in the selectedone or more paths, such that the encrypted keys of the EKB do notinclude a key corresponding to the one or more unnecessary nodes in theselected one or more paths.
 19. The information processing methodaccording to claim 18, wherein the decrypting step includes using astored key set to decrypt the extracted encrypted keys, the stored keyset including at least one key corresponding to a node or leaf of thehierarchical tree structure.
 20. The information processing methodaccording to claim 18, further comprising decrypting encrypted messagedata using the at least one obtained renewed key.
 21. The informationprocessing method according to claim 20, wherein the encrypted messagedata represents a content key that can be used as a decryption key fordecrypting encrypted content.
 22. The information processing methodaccording to claim 20, wherein the encrypted message data represents anauthentication key used in an authentication process.
 23. Theinformation processing method according to claim 20, wherein theencrypted message data represents a key for generating an integritycheck value (Icv) of content.
 24. The information processing methodaccording to claim 20, wherein the encrypted message data representsprogram code.